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ABSTRACT
The field of intellectual property (IP) law today is focused, as the name itself advertises, 
on one particular institutional approach to scientific and cultural production: IP.  When 
legal scholars explain this focus, they typically do so with reference to the virtues of price. 
Because price gives us a decentralized way to link social welfare to the production of 
information, IP is alleged to be more efficient than other approaches.  The dominant 
mode of IP scholarship begins here and then addresses questions internal to IP law—
for example, how broad or narrow should exceptions to IP rights be?  But the internalism 
that characterizes the field of IP cannot, as I show, be justified by the value of efficiency. 
Economics offers us no a priori reason to assume that IP is more efficient than other 
possible approaches, most prominently government procurement and commons-based 
production.  If we take the invitation that economists offer us to think external to IP, we 
also gain new insights about the implications of values other than efficiency for the 
choice between different institutional approaches to scientific and cultural production. 
We see, as I argue, that using price to guide scientific and cultural production—which is 
to say, using IP—may have costs not only for efficiency, but also for distributive justice 
and informational privacy.  The IP approach is in tension with the value of distributive 
justice because reliance upon price may yield not only unjust distribution of existing 
information resources but also unjust production of future information resources.  The 
IP approach is in tension with the value of information privacy because relying on 
price to generate information facilitates the desire, the demand, and perhaps the 
capacity for price discrimination.  That, in turn, generates an impulse for the extensive 
collection of personal information.  Both government procurement and commons-based 
production plausibly offer more promise than does IP in both distributive justice and 
privacy terms, and they may be no less efficient than IP.  Giving full scope to all three 
of these values thus requires us to telescope out from the internalism that characterizes 
the field, and to countenance a broader role for commons-based production and 
government procurement.  In the field of IP, I conclude, we should pay less attention to 
IP and more to the alternatives.
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that instead of a field called “environmental law” we had a field 
called “cap-and-trade law.”  We would, I think, find that odd.  Yet this is a fair 
approximation of where we find ourselves in the field of intellectual property 
(IP) law today.  The field is constructed around one particular institutional 
approach to sustaining the production of scientific and cultural goods: exclusive 
rights.  Yet it is not at all obvious that IP is categorically superior to other institu-
tional approaches.   
Other approaches not only are possible, but also, in many cases, already 
play an important role in our creative ecosystem.  Consider a brief example from 
the scientific arena.  In the United States, about one-third of all research and 
development (R&D), including more than 80 percent of basic R&D, is funded 
by government and nonprofit sectors.1  The results are often disseminated not 
under property rules, but under norms of open scientific exchange.2  This 
institutional approach,3 which we can call government contracting, is both ubi-
quitous and familiar.  It is employed when government agencies make grants or 
contract for research, in the manner commonly done by the U.S. National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) or by the U.S. Department of Defense. 
In the cultural arena, the explosion of user-generated content on the internet 
has fundamentally changed our leisure and entertainment culture.  One way to 
mark this phenomenon is to track the exponential growth of user-generated 
content sites.  Today, more than three billion videos are viewed each day on 
YouTube, and more video is uploaded to the site in thirty days than was created 
by the top three U.S. television networks in sixty years.4  While some YouTube 
content is generated by the old-fashioned content industry and is monetized, a 
substantial portion of it—from parkour performances to mashups to the ubi-
quitous toddler videos—is generated and shared without any expectation of direct 
  
1. MARK BOROUSH, NAT’L SCI. FOUND., NEW NSF ESTIMATES INDICATE THAT U.S. R&D 
SPENDING CONTINUED TO GROW IN 2008, at 6 tbl.3 (2010) (2008 data), available at 
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf10312/nsf10312.pdf. 
2. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for 
Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 315, 331–32 (2003) (discussing federal policy regarding the open sharing of data stemming 
from publicly funded research). 
3. I call these different “institutional approaches” rather than, say, “alternative mechanisms” because 
they are not always alternatives but rather are at times complementary and because the word “insti-
tution” invokes a thicker and richer field than does the concept of a mechanism. 
4. See Statistics, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/press_statistics (last visited Feb. 27, 2012). 
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profit.5  We can call this the “commons-based approach” to cultural production, 
one exemplified by phenomena such as Wikipedia and free software, and one 
that we can loosely think of as being characterized by nonproprietary norms and 
by a collaborative, self-organized production process.6 
A third approach involves financial inducement prizes.  Here, a government 
offers a financial reward to anyone who creates a desired invention—say, a 
vaccine.  The inventor enjoys the benefit of the reward, and the government 
puts the information it has purchased in the public domain.7  This approach is 
relatively uncommon today, but it has successful historical antecedents, the most 
famous perhaps being the eighteenth-century British longitude prize.8  The prize 
approach has also generated substantial—and growing—interest in the field of 
information economics today.9 
  
5. YouTube does not offer precise breakdowns of the makeup of its content, but a simple perusal of 
the site shows that much of the content on YouTube is homegrown.  A rough sense of the 
importance of content on YouTube that is produced without commercial motivation can perhaps 
be discerned from YouTube’s publicly available figures on monetization.  Through its ContentID 
system, YouTube allows copyright owners to monetize works posted on YouTube, and the site 
reports monetizing over three billion video views weekly.  Id.  That is just one-seventh of the 
overall video views, which amount to three billion daily.  Id.  Even assuming that much content-
industry material is not monetized, this suggests that a substantial portion—perhaps the 
majority—of the content viewed on YouTube is not produced through conventional 
copyright incentives. 
6. In the IP literature, the term “commons” is used to refer to a family of approaches that do not 
always align neatly under a single definition.  I discuss this, and offer a more elaborate charac-
terization of the approach, in Part I. 
7. Many prize proposals today are structured as supplements to IP incentives and so do not require 
that the resulting information be put immediately into the public domain.  They may, however, 
impose constraints on pricing or require open licensing under certain conditions.  See, e.g., Owen 
Barder, Michael Kremer & Heidi Williams, Advance Market Commitments: A Policy to Stimulate 
Investment in Vaccines for Neglected Diseases, ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, Feb. 2006, at 3, 4 (describing 
an Advanced Market Commitment (AMC) prize proposal, which obligates medicine manu-
facturers to sell their products at “low, affordable price[s] in the long-term, or to license their 
technology to other manufacturers” after sponsors of the AMC have purchased an initial, 
predetermined number of treatments at higher prices).  The classic form of a prize, however, as 
discussed in Brian Wright’s foundational work, conceives of the prize as a reward in lieu of 
exclusive rights, thus avoiding the deadweight loss associated with pricing information.  Brian D. 
Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts, 73 
AM. ECON. REV. 691, 691, 697–98, 701 (1983).  Prizes of this sort can be structured as IP 
“buyouts” in particular cases and thus may not disturb the IP system as a whole. 
8. See, e.g., DAVA SOBEL, LONGITUDE 51–60 (1995). 
9. For evidence of the renewed interest in prizes, see Michael Kremer & Heidi Williams, 
Incentivizing Innovation: Adding to the Tool Kit, 10 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 1 (2010); And 
the Winner Is . . . Offering a Cash Prize to Encourage Innovation Is All the Rage, ECONOMIST, 
Aug. 5, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/16740639; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Prizes, Not Patents, 
PROJECT SYNDICATE (Mar. 6, 2007), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stiglitz 
81/English. 
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In fact, since the 1960s, economists have debated the relative costs and 
benefits of a variety of approaches other than IP, most commonly gov-
ernment contracts and financial prizes (which I refer to together as modes of 
government procurement).  In a foundational piece, Kenneth Arrow argued that 
the most efficient means of producing information likely relied not on property 
but rather on government.10  His argument was driven by his analysis—now 
widely accepted—of the necessary inefficiencies that accompany exclusive rights 
in information. 
Because information is nonrival, as Arrow explained, it has a marginal 
cost of zero.  IP as a strategy works by putting a positive price on information: 
Creators create, then they charge others to use the information they have 
produced, thus pricing it above marginal cost.  The result is deadweight loss.11  
(It is important to note here that economists use the term “information” to refer 
to an extremely broad range of immaterial resources, from scientific formulas to 
improvements in production processes to musical compositions to the sequence 
of words in a novel.  These are all products of human minds, and insofar as they 
are immaterial, they can be shared infinitely without reducing the amount 
available to others.12  I follow this usage here since it is common and corresponds 
to the economic analysis that is central to the field.  But I also use the concept 
of “scientific and cultural production,” in part to invoke a focus on the processes of 
production rather than their reified result, and in part because the phrase calls 
forth a wider range of institutional settings than the concept of information 
production may do.) 
A few years later, Harold Demsetz offered an influential response to 
Arrow.  He suggested that despite the deadweight loss that accompanies pricing, 
property rights in information may be more efficient than government produc-
tion, largely because of the way that exclusive rights in information guide 
decisions about the allocation of inventive resources.13  Instead of relying on 
government officials to guide inventive effort, property rights harness the power 
  
10. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE 
AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 623 
(Richard Nelson ed., 1962).  I discuss the argument in more detail in Part I. 
11. One can think of it colloquially in this way: Once a song is produced, you and I and everyone we 
know can listen to it as many times as we like, with no depletion of the resource.  So, ideally, the 
song would be costless, because any positive price will reduce the access we have to the song and 
thus reduce welfare.  See also infra Part I. 
12. Transmission could have a positive marginal cost, as will the material goods in which these 
intangible objects are embedded (such as machines, CDs, books, and the like).  But the informational 
component is nonrival, and economists analyze this informational component separately. 
13. Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 14 (1969). 
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of price to transmit information between consumers and decentralized creators.14  
Price links the production of information to consumer demand, and, by exten-
sion, to social welfare. 
This argument has been so deeply internalized in the field of IP law that it 
is typically taken for granted.15  For example, the introduction of the leading IP 
casebook, coauthored by Robert Merges, Peter Menell, and Mark Lemley, states 
decisively that “[i]ntellectual property protection is necessary to encourage inven-
tors, authors, and artists to invest in the process of creation.”16  It justifies the 
institutional preference for IP only briefly, with a reference to the virtues of 
decentralized market-based systems over “central planning on a mass scale.”17  
This reflects the dominant view in the field of IP law today, which—as is 
advertised in the name—focuses on intellectual property rights as the privileged 
means of promoting scientific and cultural production.  The choice is justified, if 
at all, with reference to Demsetzian arguments that are said to establish IP 
as more efficient than the alternatives.  The core of the field of IP law today 
thus focuses on questions “internal” to IP—for example, on questions about the 
effects or interpretation of a particular doctrine of copyright or patent law, about 
how broad or narrow the scope of exclusive rights or their exceptions should be, 
or about the administration of the IP system and how it can be improved.  The 
effect is to focus our attention on questions about tradeoffs within IP law, and 
to suggest that the stakes of these questions are more important than the stakes 
of questions about the trade-offs between IP and other institutional approaches 
to cultural and scientific production.  
There is also a long and important tradition of dissent from the dominant 
internalism of the legal field.18  Over the past few years, that dissent has gained 
  
14. Id. at 12–13.  By “price” here, I simply mean payment voluntarily exchanged in private markets.  
Information is priced, in the sense I mean here, when it is treated as a commodity using a 
property rule. 
15. For examples, see infra note 40. 
16. ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 14 (5th ed. 2010). 
17. Id. at 18.  The authors go on to note that the case for IP is based “more on a generalized percep-
tion of institutional choice than on strong direct evidence of the superiority of intellectual property 
rights relative to the alternatives.”  Id.  But they offer no further discussion of the potential 
tradeoffs between different institutional choices, or of the robust economics literature that calls 
into question a generalized preference for IP. 
18. For an early and prominent dissent to the assumption that IP is necessary for economic efficiency, 
see Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: The Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and 
Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 283–84, 293–308 (1970) (concluding that the 
economic case for copyright in books “is not a strong one,” arguing that market forces such as lead 
time may be sufficient).  For a later work that considers a broader range of alternatives to IP, 
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in prominence.  A small but growing number of legal scholars have begun to 
argue for the potential of prizes and other modes of government procurement 
as alternatives or complements to an IP-based approach.19  There has also 
been a surge of interest among legal scholars in commons-based 
production of scientific and cultural goods.20  There is also a notable policy 
  
see Steve P. Calandrillo, Economic Analysis of Property Rights in Information: Justifications and 
Problems of Exclusive Rights, Incentives to Generate Information, and the Alternative of a 
Government-Run Reward System, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 301 (1998).  
Early work by Rebecca Eisenberg and Arti Rai focused attention on academic and government-
supported scientific research, for example, by analyzing the relationship between the norms that 
govern that realm and IP norms.  See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms 
of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific 
Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77 (1999).  William 
Fisher has sought to bring alternatives to IP more firmly to the center of IP conversations, both 
through theoretical arguments, see William W. Fisher, Intellectual Property and Innovation: 
Theoretical, Empirical and Historical Perspectives, in INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, INNOVATION, 
AND THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY *2–4 (A. Arundel ed., 2002), available at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/Innovation.pdf, and through detailed policy proposals, 
see WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE 
OF ENTERTAINMENT (2004).  Yochai Benkler has made similarly important contributions, 
particularly with his book on the phenomenon of commons-based peer production, YOCHAI 
BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS 
MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006).  The rich literature on the public domain also has helped 
map the “outside” of IP, although not always with a specific focus on the viability of other 
institutional approaches to scientific and cultural production.  For key contributions on the public 
domain, see JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE 
MIND (2008); David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
147 (1981); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990); Pamela Samuelson, 
Enriching Discourse on Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783 (2006). 
19. For recent legal scholarship on the potential of prizes, see, for example, FISHER, supra note 18; 
Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115 (2003); Jonathan H. 
Adler, Eyes on a Climate Prize: Rewarding Energy Innovation to Achieve Climate Stabilization, 35 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2011); Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus 
Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001); see also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a 
Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2003) 
(promoting a variant of a prize proposal).  The potential of government contracting has received 
less attention, but has been treated as promising by some legal scholars.  See Jerome H. Reichman, 
Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial Data in International Intellectual Property Law: The Case for 
a Public Goods Approach, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1 (2009).  
20. See, e.g., BOYLE, supra note 18; Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political 
Economy of Information, 52 DUKE L.J. 1245 (2003); Jorge L. Contreras, Data Sharing, Latency 
Variables, and Science Commons, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1601 (2010); Peter Lee, Toward a 
Distributed Commons in Patent Law, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 917; Michael J. Madison, Brett M. 
Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment, 95 
CORNELL L. REV. 657 (2010); Stephen M. Maurer, Arti Rai & Andrej Sali, Finding Cures for 
Tropical Diseases: Is Open Source an Answer?, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 169 (2004); Yochai 
Benkler, The Commons as a Neglected Factor of Information Policy (Working Draft Presented at 
Telecomms. Pol'y Research Conference, 1998), available at http://www.benkler.org/commons.pdf.  
See also the many commentaries on the Madison, Frischmann, and Strandburg article in the 
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interest in alternatives to IP approaches today, particularly in the potential 
of prizes.21   
I seek here to build on this dissent, by showing first that IP internalism 
cannot, as a general matter, be justified by appeals to efficiency.  That is because, 
as Part I shows, the contemporary field of information economics itself offers no 
clear endorsement of IP.  That literature has moved beyond Demsetz’s response 
to Arrow and has developed a complex conversation about the comparative 
costs and benefits of prizes, contracts, and IP—a conversation that has produced 
no definitive resolution in favor of any of these approaches.  This is well unders-
tood by those in the IP field who reject the internalist impulse.22  Scholars have 
also called attention to commons-based production as another approach that 
may be as or more efficient than IP.  The existing legal and economic literature 
teaches us, then, the question of which institutional approach to information 
production is most efficient must be examined in context, and in any case it may 
be difficult to determine with any certainty.   
If concerns about efficiency do not dictate a preference for IP, might other 
fundamental values have something to say about the matter?  As IP scholars 
have pointed out, the choices we make about information governance implicate 
a range of fundamental values, including values of privacy and distributive jus-
tice.23  Discussions about these two values have also tended to follow an internalist 
frame, asking, for example, whether distributive values generate arguments for 
  
Cornell Law Review, volume 95.  This literature is still in its infancy, and the definition of 
“commons-based production” is contested (and is discussed further in Part I).  But one measure of its 
importance is the fact that a critical counter-literature has begun to emerge.  See, e.g., Jonathan M. 
Barnett, The Illusion of the Commons, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1751 (2010). 
21. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON THE DESIGN OF AN NSF INNOVATION PRIZE, NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, INNOVATION INDUCEMENT PRIZES AT THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION 
(2007); Centennial Challenges, NASA, http://www.nasa.gov/offices/oct/early_stage_innovation/ 
centennial_challenges/index.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2012). 
22. Benkler and Fisher have done particularly important work to elucidate this point.  See BENKLER, 
supra note 18; FISHER, supra note 18. 
23. See, e.g., Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2821, 2907 (2006) (describing the potential conflicts between IP law and distributive justice, 
particularly in relation to development); Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH 
L.J. 575 (2003) [hereinafter Cohen, DRM and Privacy] (discussing the conflicts between digital 
rights management (DRM) technologies, which are part of the enforcement infrastructure for 
copyright, and privacy values).  Scholars invoke a range of other values as well, of course, such as 
democracy, authorship, creativity, freedom of thought or cultural engagement, free speech, and 
the like.  No single article could analyze the implications of all such values for the choice of insti-
tutional approaches to scientific and cultural production.  I have focused on the values of distri-
butive justice and privacy here to illustrate the implications of the externalist approach, and because 
they offer us an entry point to important new arguments about the tradeoffs between different 
institutional approaches to innovation.   
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exceptions to existing IP law.  If we adopt an externalist perspective, instead, we 
bring into view something otherwise obscured.  Using price to guide scientific and 
cultural production—which is to say, using IP—may itself generate costs from 
the perspective not only of efficiency, but also of distributive justice and privacy.   
In Part II, I show that the institutional approach of IP is in significant 
tension with distributive values.  The most obvious reason, which is in some 
sense well known and visible even from an internalist perspective, is that IP uses 
price to ration access to information goods.  Price can be a problematic way of 
distributing goods that are important to justice because the existing distribution 
of resources may be unjust.  While this concern also exists outside the domain of 
information, it is particularly meaningful here, because here we know that price 
is not necessarily a more efficient means of production than are other insti-
tutional approaches.  The usual response to distributive concerns about price, 
which suggests that we should use price to maximize efficiency and redistribute 
afterwards, therefore has little purchase in the context of information. 
The more pertinent and common objection to distributive impulses internal 
to IP law is that yielding to such impulses will undermine their own aim.  In 
other words, limiting the reach of IP will undermine the production of the very 
information that must be fairly distributed due to its importance to justice.  
When scholars debate the implications of distributive justice for international 
patent law from an internalist perspective, for example, they risk being caught in 
an eddy: The desire to make sophisticated medicines available to the poor 
around the world seems to require not only thin patent law (so that affordable 
generic drugs are available) but also robust patent law (so that new medicines for 
the poor are created).24  From inside of IP, it is difficult to dissolve this apparent 
paradox.  As I show, it can be dissolved because sometimes we can make 
modifications to IP law that will have effects that are more beneficial than 
harmful for the poor.  But the results in distributive terms will be modest, 
leaving a substantial domain of inequality that cannot be addressed from within 
an internalist paradigm. 
If we adopt an externalist view, distributive justice arguments have a much 
broader scope.  As I show, from a distributive perspective, IP is not just a proble-
matic way to distribute cultural and scientific goods that are important to justice, 
but it is also a problematic way to produce them.  In an IP system, price influences 
not only who has access to such goods, but also which goods are produced in the 
first place.  As long as the rich and the poor sometimes have different needs, 
  
24. For an example, see infra text accompanying notes 93–94. 
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as they demonstrably do, a system based on price will prioritize the needs of the 
wealthy.  Moreover, some information goods may be of such foundational 
importance to human freedoms and capabilities that all should have them 
regardless of their preferences.  Because price necessarily tracks preferences, it is a 
particularly problematic way to develop and distribute these kinds of basic 
information goods.  Commons-based production and particularly government 
procurement plausibly have advantages over IP in distributive terms because they 
yield information goods that are made available for free, and are better suited to 
attempts to direct production in ways that are divorced from preferences and 
from the existing allocation of resources. 
Part III addresses the implications of our choice of institutional approach 
for informational privacy.  As I argue, and as an externalist view allows us to 
see, choosing IP as the mode for producing and distributing information sets up 
a constitutive tension with information privacy.  When we produce and distri-
bute information through price we have the problem of deadweight loss.  The 
solution proffered is price discrimination, in which a producer charges a user a 
specifically tailored price, matched to her individual willingness and ability to 
pay.25  Price discrimination is generally thought to enhance efficiency in the 
presence of price.26  Moreover, when we rely on price, we generate a decentra-
lized impulse to price discriminate because price discrimination will enhance  
the profits of producers.  But price discrimination and privacy are in tension 
with one another because personal information is critical to the ability to cheaply 
and accurately price discriminate.  While government procurement and 
commons-based schemes may also trigger privacy concerns, there are reasons to 
think that these concerns may be less acute than those that accompany price—
and thus IP.   
In this Article, I thus offer two primary contributions to the existing 
literature.  First, I identify the tendency toward IP internalism that characterizes 
the field today and demonstrate that it is not justified by efficiency arguments.  
Giving full scope to efficiency values would require us instead to adopt an 
externalist approach—to telescope out from a singular focus on IP as the privi-
leged way to promote scientific and cultural production and to bring other institu-
tional approaches from the periphery to the center of our inquiry.  Second, I 
  
25. A more formal definition of price discrimination is the state of affairs “when the prices of similar 
products sold by the same firm show variation that cannot be attributed to cost variation.”  Frank 
Verboven, Price Discrimination (Empirical Studies), in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blum eds., 2d ed. 2008). 
26. This argument is described in detail below.  See infra note 39. 
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argue that we also cannot give full scope to values beyond efficiency without 
adopting an externalist viewpoint.  More specifically, I offer new arguments about 
the tension between the institutional approach of IP and values of distributive 
justice and informational privacy, and seek to show that both government 
procurement and commons-based approaches plausibly may generate less tension 
with both values.  
My aim is not to argue that a particular institutional approach or mix of 
institutional approaches is always best.  Indeed, my sense is that the contexts and 
resources involved are too diverse to admit to resolution in any such general way.  
Rather, I contend that we should systematically expand our field of vision so 
that the tradeoffs and complementarities between IP and other approaches 
become a central subject of the field, and so that we can more clearly debate the 
implications of our choice of approach not only for values of efficiency, but also 
for values such as distributive justice and privacy.  Notably, an external approach 
not only gives more scope to our normative inquiries, but also better corres-
ponds to the fundamentally mixed nature of our existing information ecology. 
Renaming the field to encompass something broader than IP as an approach 
would facilitate the kind of analysis called for in this Article.  It is worth noting 
in this regard that the term “intellectual property” only recently came into promi-
nence.27  But in calling for IP externalism, I mean also to suggest that we do not 
need to rename the field in order to give it a new geography.  Property law has 
been reinvented many times, all under the same name.  We can telescope out and 
adopt a broader frame of reference for our inquiries, regardless of what we call 
our efforts.  Indeed, this move is already underway.  If we embrace it as a priority, 
a new field of analysis opens up. 
  
27. For a review of the evidence about the emergence of the term, see Amy Kapczynski, The Access to 
Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 843, 846–
47 (2008).  For an influential account of the rise of the term, see Mark A. Lemley, Property, 
Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1033–34 (2005) (charting an 
“exponential” rise in the use of the term “intellectual property” in federal court opinions, with the 
inflection point in the 1980s).  What is new is less the propertization of IP than its intellec-
tualization—that is, the grouping of different doctrinal and statutory regimes under this collective 
rubric.  See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and the Information Ecosystem, 2005 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 1, 4. 
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I. AN EXTERNALIST VIEW OF EFFICIENCY AND THE AMBIVALENT 
IMPLICATIONS OF PRICE 
IP scholarship today responds primarily to the value of efficiency, and it 
generally conceives of IP as a means to generate incentives for the production of 
information.28  Although copyright, patent, trade secret, and trademark were not 
always thought of as conjoined areas of law, the rubric of information has been 
used to unite them by relying on a common analysis of the peculiar economic 
qualities of information.29 
Information is understood, in economic terms, as a nonrival good because 
one person’s consumption of it does not limit another person’s consumption.30  As 
a result, information only needs to be produced once for many people to enjoy it; 
in other words, its marginal cost of production is zero.  As such, as Kenneth 
Arrow put it in a foundational article in 1962, “any information obtained, say a 
new method of production, should, from the welfare point of view, be available 
free of charge (apart from the cost of transmitting information).  This insures 
optimal utilization of the information but, of course, provides no incentive for 
investment in research.”31  One solution to the investment problem is commodification 
  
28. See, e.g., MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 16, at 14; William Fisher, Theories of 
Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 
168, 169 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001); Lemley, supra note 27, at 1031; Peter S. Menell & 
Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
1471, 1476–82 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).  For a good example of 
arguments that operate in this mode, see WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003).  The normative appeal 
of the efficiency approach is usually understood to be welfarist in nature, with welfare being defined 
according to either wealth maximization or the Kaldor-Hicks criterion.  See Fisher, supra, at 177.  
In practice, the latter shades into the former.  See DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM 
NOWHERE 104 (2010) (“[T]he Kaldor-Hicks standard tends to prompt a shift from welfare 
maximization to wealth maximization, given that the dollar-weighted valuation of welfare impacts 
provides the most obvious and tractable method for operationalizing the hypothetical compensation 
test.”); cf. Ronald H. Coase, Economics and Contiguous Disciplines, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 201, 209 
(1978) (arguing that economics as a discipline has a substantial advantage in that “economists are 
able to use the ‘measuring rod of money’”).  Kitchians also see the purpose of IP as being the 
generation of incentives for the production of information, though they focus particularly on 
incentives that exist after the grant of a patent.  See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of 
the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977). 
29. See, e.g., MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 16, at 12 (referring to “[i]deas and 
information” as the subject of IP law); THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 134 (2007) (offering an introduction to the concept of IP that uses 
the rubric of information, and explaining that “[t]he primary reason for creating property rights in 
information is to provide incentives for producing more of it”). 
30. See, e.g., Arrow, supra note 10, at 616–17. 
31. Id.  
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of information through property rights.  But a property system funds the produc-
tion of information by allowing creators to put a positive price on its use, and 
“precisely to the extent that it is successful, there is an underutilization of the 
information.”32 
Because information should ideally be priced at zero, any positive price 
generates static (short term) inefficiency, which economists refer to as deadweight 
loss.  This kind of net loss of social welfare “occurs when people are excluded 
from using the good even though their willingnesses to pay are higher than 
the marginal cost.”33  Positive price compromises not only static but also dynamic 
efficiency because information is an input and output of its own production 
process.34  Arrow concluded from this analysis that government financing of 
R&D is likely to produce information in a more optimal way than do property 
rights.35  As he also noted, “In fact, of course, this has always happened to a cer-
tain extent.  The bulk of basic research has been carried on outside the industrial 
system, in universities, in the government, and by private individuals.”36 
Arrow’s article and analysis were extremely influential and were the subject 
of a well-known reply by Harold Demsetz in 1969.  Demsetz accused Arrow of 
turning naïvely to government after concluding that markets had inefficiencies, 
when government itself is subject to various influences that generate ineffi-
ciency—such as the rent-seeking pressures that today are often referred to under 
the rubric of capture.37  But the most influential legacy of his article has been the 
substantive suggestions he offered to counter Arrow’s conclusion that government 
financing was likely preferable to exclusive rights regimes.  He focused particularly 
on the informational problem that a government faces when seeking to separate 
the production of information goods from price.  While this might be optimal 
from the perspective of consumption, he asked, how was the government sup-
posed to “produce information on the desired directions of investment and on 
the quantities of resources that should be committed to invention?”38  Demsetz 
suggested that property rights had a fundamental advantage in guiding the effi-
cient production of information because they harness market signals to provide 
  
32. Id. at 617. 
33. SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 36 (2004). 
34. See Arrow, supra note 10, at 618; Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: 
Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991); see also BENKLER, supra 
note 18, at 37–38. 
35. Arrow, supra note 10, at 623. 
36. Id. 
37. Demsetz, supra note 13, at 9. 
38. Id. at 12. 
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creators with information about how to direct and allocate the resources that 
they invest in producing information.  The key benefit that Demsetz claimed for 
property rights in information, then, derived from the signaling function of price.  
Notably, Demsetz also pointed out that the inefficiencies of price could be dimi-
nished if transaction costs were low—an early version of the now common 
argument that perfect price discrimination can eliminate deadweight loss and 
thus the inefficiencies of pricing information.39 
IP scholarship has been deeply influenced by Demsetz’s argument (and 
behind it, the lurking shadow of Friedrich Hayek).40  His argument has also been 
influential in economics,41 but unlike in the legal literature, in economics his argu-
ment has not been treated as proof of the superior virtues of IP.  Modern infor-
mation economics instead continues to debate the comparative virtues of three 
institutional approaches: IP, financial prizes, and government contracts.42 
  
39. Id.  For a more recent articulation of the price discrimination point, see SCOTCHMER, supra 
note 33, at 37.  In theory, if a rights holder can price discriminate perfectly, charging consumers 
precisely their reservation price, he can extract the entire consumer surplus and at the same time 
eliminate deadweight loss because he now “has an incentive to serve the whole market.”  Id.; see 
also Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293, 296, 300–04 
(1970) (offering a more extensive version of the argument). 
40. See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE 
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 146 (rev. ed. 2003) (stating that prices “have the salutary effort [sic] of 
signaling consumer preference and channeling private investment in the right directions”); 
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 28, at 24 (arguing that government financing of information is 
inferior to IP because it “substitut[es] a governmental determination of the value of particular 
types of intellectual property for a market determination”); MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra 
note 16, at 18 (“[IP] rights have the advantage of limiting the government’s role in allocating 
resources to a finite set of decentralized decisions: whether particular inventions are worthy of a 
fixed period of protection.  The market then serves as the principle engine of progress.”); Fisher, 
supra note 28, at 178–79 (describing the role of the argument that private markets can best guide 
investment decisions in the IP literature); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A 
Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 
1611–12 (1982) (“Though taxation and centralized purchasing might provide a satisfactory solution 
for some public goods problems . . . for works of expression, the public goods problem is addressed 
by another method. . . . [T]he law provides a means for excluding non-purchasers.  Copyright law 
therefore allows a market for intellectual property to function.”); Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 
28, at 1499 (“In the context of stand-alone inventions or creations, intellectual property rewards 
reflect the social value of the contribution, since the profit is determined by demand.”).  For a 
version of the Hayekian argument about private information that shows its influence here, see, for 
example, F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945).  
41. See, e.g., SCOTCHMER, supra note 33, at 56 (stating that one of the virtues of IP is that “[t]he reward 
is linked to the social value of the invention, so that firms will, to some degree, compare social 
value and social cost when deciding whether to invest”). 
42. See Wright, supra note 7, at 703.  The government can also conduct research itself, rather than 
contracting it out, although this possibility has received little focus in the economics literature.  Its 
benefits might be understood via literature on the nature of the firm, see R.H. Coase, The Nature 
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One reason why the debate has continued is the articulation, in the eco-
nomic literature, of an additional possible inefficiency associated with using the 
price system in the context of information—one that draws on the work of 
economists such as Yoram Barzel and Glenn Loury.43  The problem is referred to 
as one of racing because it depends upon rewards being distributed through a 
contest structured like a race.  For example, patent law awards exclusive rights to 
an invention to the first inventor to meet the requirements of the law.  Racing is 
likely to be a problem when the rewards for information are high, and when the 
costs and risks of developing it are relatively low.  The expected result will be 
wasted inventive effort: Too many players will chase the same reward and dissi-
pate resources in the process.44 
The problem is akin to that elaborated in the literature on common pool 
resources.  Assume that X amount of fish has a market value of one thousand 
dollars and can be caught at a cost of one hundred dollars.  If companies have an 
equal chance of catching the fish and any company may enter, up to ten of them 
will be willing to race for their chance at the reward of one thousand dollars.  
Their competition with one another will result in wasted resources: One 
thousand dollars will be spent to catch fish that could have been captured for 
one hundred dollars.  A similar problem applies to the creation of information 
goods.  Imagine that two companies have an equal probability of creating an 
invention, but only the one that does so first will get the reward.  If the social 
reward of the patent is large compared to the investment that each company must 
commit to enter the race, both may enter, which inefficiently duplicates costs.45  
The problem can be described more abstractly as a problem of asymmetries 
of information and of the difficulties in aggregating information in private 
markets.46  As they make their decisions about whether to invest in a project, 
  
of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937), and its costs via some of the differences between gov-
ernments and firms in, for example, their relationships to competition. 
43. See Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 348 (1968); Glenn 
C. Loury, Market Structure and Innovation, 93 Q. J. ECON. 395 (1979). 
44. John Duffy has pointed out that in the context of a patent system, in which earlier invention also 
leads to earlier expiry of a patent, speeding up invention also speeds up the dedication of the 
invention to the public domain.  See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 444 (2004).  But he does not argue, nor can one conclude a priori, that 
this benefit exceeds the cost of patent races in terms of effort duplication and of excessive inven-
tion speed. 
45. SCOTCHMER, supra note 33, at 46. 
46. See Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?, 
in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51, 57 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott 
Stern eds., 2002). 
The Cost of Price 985 
firms are unlikely to know one another’s cost or value estimates.  Thus, they will 
be unable to make efficient decisions about whether to enter the race.47  Racing 
may also lead research to proceed at a rate that is faster than socially optimal, 
again leading to waste.48  It may be difficult to distinguish in practice between 
a wasteful patent race, and a race that produces worthwhile shifts in the speed 
or quality of invention.  But insofar as racing is thought to be a risk, it can 
be remedied by either limiting entry or downwardly adjusting the price paid 
to inventors.49   
In the 1980s, Brian Wright drew on the racing literature and on the dif-
ferent relationships that prizes and contracts have to private information, to 
establish an important new account of the tradeoffs between the three main 
institutional approaches to information production debated in economics.  He 
concluded that no one of these schemes has absolute efficiency advantages over 
the others.  Each has benefits and drawbacks, and judgments between them in 
turn depend upon assessments of a wide variety of variables.  IP and prizes, for 
example, both generate the risk of racing.50  Government contracts limit the 
number of entrants, so they may be superior whenever racing is a major concern.  
That, in turn, is a function of a variety of considerations, such as the competi-
tiveness of the market and the ease of market entry,51 the ratio of reward to 
cost, and the relative riskiness of the investment.52  
Insofar as government contracts delegate the responsibility to undertake 
research to a limited number of parties, they avoid the problem of racing.  But, 
  
47. Id. 
48. See, e.g., Partha Dasgupta & Joseph Stiglitz, Uncertainty, Industrial Structure, and the Speed of R&D, 
11 BELL J. ECON. 1 (1980). 
49. Wright, supra note 7, at 694.  A third source of suboptimal allocation that some identify with the 
price mechanism is the problem of suboptimal allocation of resources to invention, which results 
from the fact that innovations invariably generate spillovers that cannot be fully internalized.  See, 
e.g., Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q. J. ECON. 
1137, 1140–41 (1998).  This is, however, simply the flip side of the racing problem; when returns 
do match social welfare, there is a risk of too much investment if multiple entrants are possible.  
Moreover, if inventive efforts did lead to full returns, the allocation between creative and noncreative 
endeavors likely would be distorted since noncreative endeavors will not yield rewards equivalent 
to social value if we assume that markets are reasonably competitive.  See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., 
Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives–Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 576–77 (1996). 
50. Racing seems more likely to be a concern in patent law than in copyright law, though, because a 
copyright for a book, for example, does not really have the form of a prize available to whichever 
party writes it first.  See SCOTCHMER, supra note 33, at 98. 
51. See Eric A.A. de Laat, Patents or Prizes: Monopolistic R&D and Asymmetric Information, 15 INT’L J. 
INDUS. ORG. 369, 370 (1996) (noting that Wright’s analysis “assumes perfect competition and free 
entry in the R&D process”). 
52. See Wright, supra note 7, at 703; see also Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 28, at 1489. 
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they invite another problem understood by Demsetz: the risk that the gov-
ernment will make poor decisions about whom to hire.  IP can make better use 
of private information about the comparative efficiency of entrants than can 
government contracts—but prizes have the same advantage because individuals 
also self-select to compete for them.53  Because ex ante contracts pay for effort 
rather than for results, the possibility of shirking also arises.  Thus, one parame-
ter that influences the efficiency of government contracting is the observability of 
effort.54  Later work has pointed out that some of the drawbacks of government 
contracting can be mitigated if the government employs mechanisms to gather 
decentralized information about the best creator, such as auctioning off the right 
to the contract.55  The problem of shirking may also be mitigated, for example, 
by awarding grants to communities of repeat players.56 
The most serious problem for government contracts is likewise the most 
serious problem for prizes: The government must determine what to pay for and 
how much to pay.57  Too small a reward relative to social value will lead to too 
little invention; too large a reward, in turn, will lead to wasted inventive effort.  
On the other hand, patents only clearly have benefits over the other two systems 
if innovators have important information about the value of the desired invention 
or creation.58  This advantage may be substantial if we assume that governments 
often will be less likely than private investors to know of the existence of possible 
creations or inventions, much less of their value.  
Recent work on prize design, however, shows that the informational advan-
tage of patents may be less substantial than once thought.  The key insight is that 
the size of a prize need not be established ex ante.  It can also be determined ex 
post—when there is better and more widely distributed information about value.  
For example, Michael Kremer has suggested an ex post patent buyout mechan-
ism that uses an auction to elicit private information about the value of the 
  
53. See Wright, supra note 7, at 703. 
54. Kremer, supra note 49, at 1143; Wright, supra note 7, at 703. 
55. See Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 46, at 58. 
56. See, e.g., SCOTCHMER, supra note 33, at 248–50. 
57. See Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 46, at 58–59.  Although the conventional account does not 
emphasize this, it is important to recognize that IP systems have this problem too, insofar as the 
government must establish the length and breadth of exclusive rights.  This practically sets the size of 
the market that will act as the inducement.  I thank Lisa Larrimore Ouellette for this point. 
58. See Wright, supra note 7, at 703.  It is possible that a government with good information about 
costs could induce firms to reveal their information about value.  See de Laat, supra note 51.  But this 
level of knowledge about costs may be unlikely, and problems of verification would still exist.  See 
Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 46, at 60. 
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invention.59  Steven Shavell and Tanguy Van Ypersele subsequently brought 
attention to the possibility that prize amounts could be set on the basis of market 
sales.60  The latter model has been the subject of important recent proposals for 
innovative incentive mechanisms, most prominently in the areas of pharmaceut-
ical research and music.  These incentive mechanisms would reward creators 
according to a measure of the uptake of their creations, and at the same time, 
would address deadweight loss by suspending price in lieu of a prize.61  While 
these models would require funding, presumably through taxation (which also 
generates deadweight loss), price is equivalent to a tax on a single market, “which 
is generally thought to impose greater deadweight loss than the broad-based taxa-
tion that generates general revenue.”62 
The main drawback with such models is likely the expense of adminis-
tration, which increases with prize complexity.63  But IP, prizes, and government 
contracts all have costs of implementation, so the matter is really one of compar-
ative cost.  Commentators have also emphasized the potential problem of capture 
when innovation is induced through prizes and contracts.64  But insofar as IP sys-
tems generate rents, they also attract rent seeking—as they clearly have in recent 
years.65  Commentators have additionally worried that prizes carry a risk that the 
government may renege on its promise to pay after costs have been sunk.66  This 
problem is minimized with contracts because contracts pay up front.  But IP 
mechanisms may have their own problems of uncertainty because, for example, 
  
59. Kremer, supra note 49, at 1146–48.  In order to increase the accuracy of the information elicited, 
in some small percentage of cases the highest bidder would be awarded the invention. 
60. Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 19, at 542.  The authors suggest that optional prizes will be 
superior to the patent system alone, but they also allow that mandatory prizes may be preferable to 
the extent that we expect large deadweight loss problems.  See id. at 540. 
61. See FISHER, supra note 18, at 202; James Love & Tim Hubbard, Prizes for Innovation in New 
Medicines and Vaccines, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 155, 159–60 (2009).  
62. Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 46, at 54; see also Joseph E. Stiglitz, Knowledge as a Global Public 
Good, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
308, 312–13 (Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg & Marc. A. Stern eds., 1999).  
63. See Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 46, at 56.  If private investment markets for innovation work 
poorly, these kinds of prizes may also have a disadvantage as compared to government contracts 
because they assume that private financing will drive early stages of research in advance of the prize. 
64. See Kremer, supra note 49, at 1143. 
65. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 28, at 220; William W. Fisher & Talha Syed, A Prize 
System as a Partial Solution to the Health Crisis in the Developing World 14–15 (unpublished 
draft), available at http://www.tfisher.org/Prizes5.2.pdf. 
66. These variables are central to Brian Wright’s account, and they have been further developed in 
subsequent literature.  See Wright, supra note 7, at 703–04; see also SCOTCHMER, supra note 33, at 
31–59; Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, Procuring Knowledge, in 15 ADVANCES IN 
THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION & ECONOMIC GROWTH 1 (Gary D. 
Libecap ed., 2004). 
988 59 UCLA L. REV. 970 (2012) 
the value of investments may be subject to stochastic, black-swan events.67  
IP systems, like prize systems, are also subject to ex post changes that can 
diminish the benefits that were expected ex ante, such as compulsory licensing 
schemes or even simple shifts to doctrinal rules about the scope of protection 
or remedies. 
As described, then, the post-Demsetzian economics literature has proli-
ferated a series of parameters that influence the comparative efficiency of these 
different systems, including, most importantly, the competitiveness of the research 
environment; the cost of research as compared to the value of the reward; the 
riskiness of research or creativity; the importance of private information about 
the cost or value of creation; the costs of overseeing effort in the context of 
contracts; and the comparative costs of rent seeking, uncertainty, and the admin-
istration of each system.  The information economics literature thus offers no 
general endorsement of any mechanism, much less a clear endorsement of IP. 
A more recent focus in the legal literature on transaction costs, anti-
commons problems, and externalities has amplified the set of concerns expressed 
in the foundational economic literature about the efficiency of the price mechan-
ism.  If IP is to do a good job of aligning private reward and social value, 
transacting between those who created the good and those who benefit from it 
must be fairly easy.  But transactions over information instead are likely to be par-
ticularly costly.  For example, Brett Frischmann and Mark Lemley have pointed 
to the greater uncertainty about the bounds of information goods (for example, 
what a patent covers) and the bounds of associated legal entitlements (for 
example, what fair use permits).68  Robert Merges has argued that strategic 
bargaining problems may be especially common in the context of patent law 
because advances in technology are particularly hard to value.69  Christopher 
Buccafusco and Christopher Sprigman have used experiments to show that the 
endowment effect operates in the context of creative works, concluding that 
  
67. See, e.g., NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY 
IMPROBABLE 28–29 (2007) (arguing that information markets are particularly prone to fat-tails and 
black-swan effects). 
68. Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 274–75 (2007).  
Mark Lemley also points out that IP rights can be assigned partially, and that they may require 
especially expensive monitoring to enforce.  Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in 
Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1053 (1997); cf. Gordon, supra note 40, at 1628 
(discussing the difficulty of identifying many uses of copyrighted works). 
69. Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 
62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 83–84 (1994). 
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“private transactions in creative goods may face significant transaction costs 
arising from cognitive biases.”70 
Moreover, while Demsetz and many after him have argued that low trans-
action costs, and in particular perfect price discrimination, can diminish or even 
eliminate the deadweight loss associated with pricing information, Yochai 
Benkler has shown that perfect price discrimination is not expected even in 
theory because it is costly, and because it becomes more costly as it becomes more 
perfect.71  At best, we can expect imperfect price discrimination, meaning that the 
problem of deadweight loss that is associated with price in the context of infor-
mation is persistent.72  To illustrate the potential difficulties of price discrim-
ination, consider the scientist who values the use of a particular research tool at 
one thousand dollars, or the patient who values the use of a diagnostic test at one 
thousand dollars.  Assume that the cost of the tangible aspect of this tool or test is 
negligible, so that we can focus on the cost of the information good itself.  If the 
price charged for each use of the tool or test is two thousand dollars, these indi-
viduals will forego the use, resulting in deadweight loss: the lost social utility 
represented by the difference between the value of this information good to these 
users and its marginal cost of zero.  If the firm could determine and charge each 
party their precise willingness to pay, the inefficiency would disappear (although 
with distributive implications because the surplus goes into the pocket of the 
producer).  But it will be costly and perhaps impossible to gather the information 
needed to price discriminate in this way and to prevent higher-valuing consumers 
from taking advantage of the prices paid by lower-valuing consumers.  So price 
discrimination will invariably be imperfect at best. 
Persistent externalities may also be especially common where information is 
concerned.  Economists have long predicted that the price mechanism will 
  
70. Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: An Experiment, 96 
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4 (2010).  The experiments in question did not indicate that the endowment 
effect was larger with respect to created works than to other forms of property, but the authors 
hypothesize that this is so and claim to have demonstrated it in follow-up experiments.  Id. at 29. 
71. See Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in Information Transactions, 53 VAND. 
L. REV. 2063, 2072 (2000) (arguing that because price discriminators must, for example, determine 
the appropriate price and prevent arbitrage, “[t]he product is never sold to each and every consumer 
at his or her valuation, but is instead sold in categories the size of which is determined by the costs of 
identifying and implementing price discrimination for that group of consumers”). 
72. See id. at 2075–76; see also SCOTCHMER, supra note 33, at 37 (noting that price discrimination is 
“hard to implement” because of problems like arbitrage).  Suzanne Scotchmer’s point is the practical 
version of Benkler’s objection: Because, in practice, perfect price discrimination is difficult (that is, 
expensive), monopolists will not undertake it.  Price discrimination, of course, also has distributional 
effects, which may be relevant to the considerations in Part II, infra. 
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produce insufficient investment in basic science because such efforts are relatively 
risky and distant from market applications.73  Legal commentators have more 
recently brought attention to the externality problem in the context of expressive 
works.  For example, access to copyrighted works can help develop “human 
capital” as well as educate and socialize individuals—benefits that are unlikely to 
be reflected in the price an individual party to a transaction is willing to pay 
for a good.74  The problem of externalities is likely to be particularly acute 
in the context of information because future innovators build on existing infor-
mation goods.75  Transaction cost and externality concerns are important 
components of the recent debates about the potential for an anticommons in 
information goods.76  If information is subject to especially high transaction costs, 
then in this context, price is also particularly problematic. 
More recently, legal scholars have also brought attention to the prevalence of 
another mode of producing information goods that exists alongside IP and gov-
ernment procurement: commons-based production.  This literature is in its 
infancy and has yet to produce a single, universally-accepted definition of a 
commons-based approach.77  A definition can be approximated by considering 
  
73. See Richard R. Nelson, The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research, 67 J. POL. ECON. 297, 
301 (1959). 
74. Brett M. Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright Law, 3 REV. L. & ECON. 649, 
660 (2007).  For further arguments about the disconnect between social and private benefits in the 
context of information, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE 
THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY 81–82 (2008); C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What 
It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311, 326 (1997); Gordon, supra note 40, at 1630. 
75. Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 68, at 268–69; see also Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic 
Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917 (2005); Menell & 
Scotchmer, supra note 28, at 1499 (noting the problem of cumulative innovation, in which “the 
most important social benefit of an innovation may be the boost given to later innovators, and this 
may make the benefits harder to appropriate”). 
76. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons 
in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998).  For the debates about the extent to which 
anticommons effects exist today, see, for example, Zhen Lei, Rakhi Juneja & Brian Wright, 
Patents Versus Patenting: Implications of Intellectual Property Protection for Biological Research, 27 
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 36 (2009); Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Do Formal Intellectual 
Property Rights Hinder the Free Flow of Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons 
Hypothesis, 63 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 648 (2007); John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora & Wesley 
M. Cohen, Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE 
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003); 
Fiona Murray et al., Of Mice and Academics: Examining the Effect of Openness on Innovation (NBER 
Working Paper No. 14819, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14819; Heidi 
L. Williams, Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation: Evidence From the Human Genome (NBER 
Working Paper No. 16213, 2010),  available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16213.  
77. See, e.g., Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, supra note 20 (setting out an approach for studying 
what they call the “constructed cultural commons,” but without specifically defining the term); 
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the family resemblance between the examples frequently cited by those who 
invoke the knowledge commons—examples such as free- and open-source 
software, Wikipedia, university-based science, and the informal cultural produc-
tion exemplified by multiplayer online games and jam band fan communities.78 
Drawing on these examples and on the nascent literature, we can treat the 
commons as a distinct institutional approach to scientific and cultural production 
that can be distinguished from property approaches along three parameters: 
(1) rules of access, (2) sources of support, and (3) modes of governance.   
Prototypically, IP systems are based on norms of exclusion, support the 
development of information by revenues associated with its sale, and 
concentrate governance into a single decisionmaker (who may then delegate 
to others).  In contrast, a commons-based approach is characterized by the 
voluntary sharing of information assets, either without preconditions or 
with conditions that apply reciprocally to all; by the fact that it sustains the 
production of information by means other than price (for example, through 
intrinsically motivated contributions of effort or resources from creators, or 
through public support); and by disaggregated governance, with groups rather 
than individuals being entitled to contribute to decisions about resource use 
and about the norms governing the community. 
Commons-based production is an important part of our system of informa-
tion production, perhaps especially today.79  Advances in computing technology 
and the vast digital networks that have followed have lowered the cost of partic-
ipating as a producer, not merely as a consumer, of information online.  As is 
evident to anyone who has spent time on YouTube, MySpace, or popular 
websites like awkwardfamilyphotos.com, the internet today plays host to a 
“newly invigorated folk culture—created by and among individuals and groups, 
  
BENKLER, supra note 18, at 61–62 (defining a commons as a domain in which “no single person 
has exclusive control over the use and disposition of any particular resource in the commons” and 
stating that “commons based” means that “the inputs and outputs of the process are shared, freely 
or conditionally, in an institutional form that leaves them equally available for all”).  Benkler’s 
definition incorporates what many would call the “public domain” into the commons, while others 
distinguish the two, defining the commons as a stinted domain of active and communal governance, 
and defining the public domain as more simply free to exploitation from all comers.  See Amy 
Kapczynski, Access to Knowledge: A Conceptual Genealogy, in ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE 
AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 17, 32 (Gaëlle Krikorian & Amy Kapczynski eds., 2010). 
78. See, e.g., BENKLER supra note 18, at 63–67, 70–74 (discussing free- and open-source software, 
Wikipedia, and multiplayer online games); Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, supra note 20, at 
661–63, 690 (discussing the examples of open-source software, Wikipedia, and jam band fan 
communities—for example, those that followed the Grateful Dead). 
79. BENKLER, supra note 18, at 35. 
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rather than by professionals for passive consumption.”80  Perhaps more surpri-
singly, the digital networked age has also produced sophisticated, industrial-scale 
commons-based production, as exemplified by the domain of free- and open-
source software.81  
Moreover, commons-based production may have efficiency advantages over 
the alternatives in at least some circumstances.  Commons-based production does 
not rely on price.  That means it avoids the deadweight loss problem associated 
with exclusive rights, so it will be superior to IP except when it is substantially 
less efficient in an allocative sense.82  Benkler makes the case that commons-based 
production may be more efficient than market-based production at allocating 
both creative effort and excess computational capacity, largely because of the 
diminished transaction costs associated with allowing people to self-select into 
projects, as well as the avoidance of fine-grained pricing and evaluation of inputs 
and outputs.83 
Commons-based production can at times rival price and government 
procurement in efficiency terms.  This is not to say that it is definitively more effi-
cient than the alternatives.  Perhaps the most salient potential efficiency problem 
with the commons as a mode of production is the possibility that it will underpro-
duce information goods as compared to what is optimal.  This is, in effect, a 
Demsetzian worry: Commons-based production generates substantial external 
benefits that are not internalized by producers.84  It is therefore quite possible that 
if we were to rely solely on the commons to produce our music, for example, we 
would allocate too few resources to the creation of music.  But to know whether 
this is the case, we would have to know what the optimal allocation would be.85  
While a Demsetzian might suggest that price mechanisms will lead to optimal 
investment in information production, it is not obviously the case, for example, 
  
80. Id. at 466; see also LESSIG, supra note 74.  For evolving attempts to capture and filter some of the 
memes emerging from this domain, see, for example, KNOW YOUR MEME, http://knowyour 
meme.com (last visited Feb. 27, 2012). 
81. See Yochai Benkler, Intellectual Property and the Organization of Information Production, 22 INT’L REV. 
L. & ECON. 81, 85 (2002); Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, Open Source Software: 
The New Intellectual Property Paradigm, in HANDBOOK OF ECONOMICS AND INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS 285 (Terrence Hendershott ed., 2006). 
82. See BENKLER, supra note 18, at 107. 
83. Id. at 115. 
84. Cf. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348 (1967).  
85. See George L. Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About Intellectual Property, 8 RES. L. & 
ECON. 19, 23 (1986). 
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because of the problems of transaction costs, externalities, and racing.86  Addi-
tionally, the price mechanism can distort allocation away from the optimum if it 
provides more than competitive returns in an environment in which normal com-
modities only produce competitive returns.87 
In sum, there are many modes of producing information.  As old debates 
and recent developments in the field of information economics show, no general 
case can be made that the price mechanism is the most efficient means of produc-
ing and disseminating information.  The seriousness of transaction cost problems 
in the context of information, as well as the existence of commons-based strate-
gies of information production, provide further challenges to any assumption 
that price is the best way to efficiently produce information goods.  Whether 
price, and thus IP, will serve as a better or worse form of inducement than will 
the many other possibilities depends on a multitude of factors that, at a min-
imum, must be assessed in context, and that may be difficult to assess with a high 
degree of confidence. 
Paradoxically, then, although IP law is typically defended with reference to 
values of efficiency, information economics teaches us that there is no reason 
to treat IP as clearly more efficient than the alternatives.  This is readily apparent 
if we begin not from an internalist perspective, but rather from an externalist pers-
pective and from the broader frame of reference that it permits. 
II. EXTERNALISM, PRICE, AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
Although IP scholars typically reason in the idiom of efficiency, a small 
but growing number of them have begun to suggest that distributive justice 
values should also influence information policy.  But almost invariably, they do 
so from an internalist perspective.  An externalist perspective gives far more 
scope to distributive concerns.  It also allows us to see new dimensions of the 
  
86. These are not the only objections to this argument.  Also important are possible dynamics of 
crowding out of inventive effort when payment is deployed.  See infra note 198.  The distributive 
problems of markets are also relevant here because they suggest that price may systematically 
diverge from social welfare when the poor are limited not by their willingness but rather by their 
ability to pay.  See infra Part II. 
87. See Calandrillo, supra note 18, at 330; Lunney, supra note 49, at 577 (“If copyright expands its 
protection too much in an attempt to ‘award’ an author the ‘value’ of her work when the rest of our 
economy operates on a ‘cost’ basis, it will generate both inefficiency and unfairness.”).  Moreover, if 
the IP mechanisms used to harness the price mechanism are also incomplete, in the sense that 
they do not encompass all forms of valuable information, this will yield another kind of allocative 
distortion.  See Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, Nonexcludability and the Limits of Patents 
(Feb. 10, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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problem that IP can pose for distributive justice, and the concomitant potential 
of government procurement and commons-based approaches from a distr-
ibutive perspective.88  
Molly Van Houweling’s analysis of the implications of copyright law’s 
design for poor creators is one of the best developed distributive justice 
arguments in IP scholarship, and it offers a good example of the internalist 
approach.89  She is concerned with the distribution of creative opportunity, 
and she therefore focuses on the burdens that copyright law may impose upon 
creators who have little money.90  She argues that the problems copyright may 
pose from a distributive perspective have become more acute as new digital 
technologies have democratized creation and have made amateurs more visible 
to those who want to extract revenues from the copyrighted works that amateurs 
may draw upon.91  She then proposes a shift in copyright law so that those 
who are not profiting from their creations could qualify more easily for the fair 
use defense.92  
Another substantial attempt to introduce distributive values to IP, this 
time in the context of international IP law, comes from Margaret Chon.  Her 
analysis also proceeds from an internalist perspective, focusing on the constraints 
that international treaties impose on the distribution of human capabilities around 
the world, as well as offering policy solutions internal to that law (for example, the 
  
88. Others have called attention to parts of this proverbial elephant, and I draw on their work below.  
Benkler has argued for the potential distributive benefits of the commons.  See infra text 
accompanying note 114.  Fisher’s argument that a prize system is structurally better suited than 
the copyright system to promote semiotic democracy seems to embody a distributive concern, and 
it depends on insights about the nature of exclusive rights systems that are similar to those 
discussed below.  See FISHER, supra note 18, at 28–31.  Fisher and Syed have argued that prizes 
are better suited than patents to address the problem of neglected diseases in developing 
countries, apparently with distributive concerns in mind.  See Fisher & Syed, supra note 65, at 
9.  Although not a legal scholar, James Love’s work in the area of neglected diseases has 
distributive concerns at its core and has been important to the thinking of many legal scholars 
on distributive questions in IP, including myself.  For examples of his work, see James Love, 
Prizes to Stimulate Innovation, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Aug. 12, 2009, 10:12 AM), 
http://keionline.org/prizes. 
89. See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535 (2005). 
90. Id. at 1537. 
91. Id. at 1539. 
92. Id. at 1567.  Fair use doctrine permits unauthorized copying of some or all of a copyrighted work, 
and depends on considerations such as whether the copying is transformative and the effect 
that the copying might have on the market for the original work.  For insightful analysis of how 
fair use is applied by courts, see Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use 
Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair 
Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009). 
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expansion of the exceptions and limitations in IP treaties).93  The common 
rejoinder to such proposals is that increasing flexibilities in international law will 
undermine incentives to innovate.94  To this, Chon says that “equality tilts the 
balance towards static efficiency and away from dynamic efficiency arguments, 
at least for resource-poor areas of the world.”95  As this statement exemplifies, 
from an internalist perspective, those concerned with distributive justice appear 
to be caught in a paradox that requires them to choose between access to 
information and the creation of information.  This is in fact not strictly so, but 
it is the case that for debates about information policy, taking an internalist 
viewpoint truncates the implications of a distributive justice perspective. 
The literature on distributive justice in the IP field is meager enough that 
it is worth beginning by clarifying just what such an approach implies.  Theories 
of distributive justice address the just allocation of resources in a society.96  While 
theorists of distributive justice rarely make reference to information itself as a 
resource of concern,97 it is without doubt that information is of substantial impor-
tance to distributive justice today.  For example, textbooks, newspapers, and 
medicines are all informational goods (by which I mean goods whose value is in 
important part constituted by their information content).  Art, literature, and 
music are also encompassed under the broad rubric of information, and they 
are of clear importance to community and political life.  
  
93. See, e.g., Chon, supra note 23, at 2907.  Chon draws upon the capabilities framework of Amartya 
Sen, which is described later in this Part.  Other notable arguments in the distributive justice vein 
include one offered by Syed, who focuses on the temporal problem that IP systems will gen-
erate innovations for which the poor must wait to access.  See Talha Syed’s Remarks at the A2K4 
Conference on Access to Knowledge and Human Rights at Yale Law School (Feb. 12, 2010, 11:06 AM), 
http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/4670860.  But this, too, remains within an internalist frame. 
94. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein & F. Scott Kieff, Questioning the Frequency and Wisdom of Compulsory 
Licensing for Pharmaceutical Patents, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 71, 80 (2011); Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, 
Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha “Solution,” 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 47, 49 (2002). 
95. Chon, supra note 23, at 2891. 
96. See, e.g., G.A. Cohen, Where the Action Is: On the Site of Distributive Justice, 26 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 3, 3 (1997) (stating that distributive justice refers to the “just distribution of benefits and 
burdens in society”); see also Serge-Christophe Kolm, Distributive Justice, in A COMPANION TO 
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 438, 438–39 (Robert E. Goodin & Philip Pettit 
eds., 1995) (defining distributive justice and noting that theories of distributive justice differ 
according to the “ethically relevant variables” that they deem to be important to the just allocation 
of resources). 
97. There are exceptions to this statement, although, to my knowledge, references to information 
itself as a resource of concern tend to be episodic.  Sen, for example, specifically cites “the reform 
of patent laws to make well-established and cheaply producible drugs more easily available to 
needy but poor patients (for example, those who are suffering from AIDS)” as a question of justice 
that a capabilities approach can address, but he does not explain exactly how the capabilities 
approach applies to this context.  AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 24–25 (2009). 
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The intensity of informational goods’ importance to well-being is perhaps 
easiest to illustrate in the domain of health.  Since the 1950s, global average life 
expectancy has increased by almost twenty years.98  According to the World 
Health Organization, these gains are largely attributable to “[t]he application of 
knowledge from health research”99 to improve, for example, sanitation and access 
to vaccines.  These gains are, of course, unevenly distributed, and up to ten 
million lives per year could be saved simply by providing better access to existing 
informational goods such as medicines and vaccines.100  More research aimed 
at developing new vaccines and medicines for diseases that particularly affect the 
poor in developing countries could save many more lives still.101  
IP is problematic, from a distributive justice perspective, for reasons that 
in some sense are well known: IP rations access via the price mechanism, and so 
it distributes resources in a way that is sensitive to the background allocation of 
resources.  Yet the background allocation of resources may be unjust.102  This 
is the implicit basis of the internalist arguments made by both Chon and Van 
Houweling, for example: Copyright and patent law both disadvantage the vir-
tuous poor because they make price a ticket for entry.  Conversely, the poor will 
benefit disproportionately, in terms of access, when information goods are availa-
ble without price or at a low price. 
This basic tension between price and access to goods that are important to 
justice is familiar, and it is not limited to the domain of information.  The usual 
response from those who favor price is that efficiency should be maximized first, 
and that distributive issues should be attended to thereafter.103  The argument 
  
98. WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2003: SHAPING THE FUTURE 
1 (2003). 
99. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE FOR BETTER HEALTH: 
STRENGTHENING HEALTH SYSTEMS 1 (2004). 
100. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., EQUITABLE ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES: A 
FRAMEWORK FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 1 (2004) (concluding that ten million lives could be 
saved each year by increasing access to existing medicines). 
101. See, e.g., William W. Fisher & Talha Syed, Global Justice in Healthcare: Developing Drugs for the 
Developing World, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 612 (2007) (arguing that expenditures for 
research on neglected diseases should be increased from the current 2 to 3 percent of global 
medical research expenditures to reflect the fact that neglected diseases account for 16.4 percent of 
the global disease burden). 
102. Many theorists of distributive justice make this point, of course.  For one argument that an initial 
just allocation of minimum resources is a condition of distributive justice in the liberal state, see 
BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999). 
103. For the foundational elaboration of this argument, see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the 
Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 
667, 674–75 (1994). 
The Cost of Price 997 
has intuitive appeal; if one wants to redistribute resources, one must have 
resources to redistribute.  This argument is not without its detractors,104 and in 
particular it applies poorly beyond the nation-state, where no post hoc tax and 
transfer mechanisms exist.  But whatever the general merits of this argument 
may be, it has little purchase in the context of information goods.  As described 
above, in the context of information, the effects of price on efficiency are uncer-
tain.  If we can get the same or similar results in terms of efficiency, but 
intrinsically better distributive results (avoiding, for example, both the cost and 
the political uncertainty of post hoc redistribution), then there is no reason to 
accept the cost (in distributive terms) that price requires. 
The problem with distributive justice arguments that favor IP exceptions is 
less this familiar argument that we should prioritize efficiency than it is the appar-
ently self-defeating nature of these exceptions.  Because IP both helps to create 
and constrains access to the goods that we want, we have the appearance of a 
paradox: If we make IP more flexible so that the poor have more access, the 
poor will also have less access—because the information that we want the poor 
to access is less likely to be created.  This dilemma causes Chon, for example, to 
assert that static concerns (namely, access today) must be prioritized over dynamic 
ones (namely, future scientific and cultural production). 
There is in fact no true paradox here, because sometimes we can give the 
poor access to information goods without substantially undermining innova-
tion.  This is best illustrated by arguments developed in the transnational 
context showing that developing countries are best off if they make liberal use 
of their right under international IP law to override patents on medicines.105  
While this move reduces returns to innovators, developing countries make up a 
very small portion of innovator markets; all of Africa, for example, makes up just 
  
104. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, The Rational Choice Approach to Legal Rules, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
177, 179 (1989); Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 1653 (1998); Duncan Kennedy, Law-and-Economics From the Perspective of 
Critical Legal Studies, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE 
LAW 465, 470–71 (1998); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A 
Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 401 (1981); Richard S. Markovits, On the Relevance of Economic 
Efficiency Conclusions, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 37–40 (2001). 
105. See, e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 31, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299, 333; World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002). 
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1 percent of the global market for innovator pharmaceutical companies.106  Even 
when considering all developing countries together and looking at their share of 
gross domestic product, rather than looking at the existing state of pharmaceut-
ical markets (which are affected by patent regimes), the marginal incentive that 
could be created by market demand in these jurisdictions is relatively small, 
while the barrier to access that patents may pose to local consumers is large.107  
It is thus possible to make exceptions to IP law that will disproportionately 
benefit the poor, despite the potential dynamic effects.  The use of so-called com-
pulsory licenses in poor countries to promote access to medicines represents pre-
cisely this kind of move. 
This point can be generalized: Often the poor (and especially the very poor) 
are so poor that they make up very little of an expected market for an inno-
vation.  Giving them access to goods by exempting them from exclusion rights 
can thus yield more in access than it would compromise in terms of innovation.  
Even from an efficiency perspective, and certainly from a distributive perspective, 
such users should ride for free if the scheme can be administered with reasonable 
accuracy and without excessive expense.108 
But the free-riding strategy has clear limitations.  It may be difficult or costly 
to identify the poor.  And, at some point, access for the poor will undercut 
incentives substantially enough to undermine incentives to generate informa-
tion.  Again, we can illustrate with an example in the medicines context.  It is no 
accident that the global access to medicines campaign and its focus on addressing 
patent barriers to medicines arose out of the HIV/AIDS movement.  A large 
enough community of people living with HIV in wealthy countries existed to 
attract investment into new medicines to treat HIV.  No similar interest exists 
  
106. WORLD HEALTH ORG., COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND 
PUB. HEALTH, PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 15 
tbl. 1.4 (2006) (2005 data provided by IMS health). 
107. Frederick Scherer shows that if extending patents to all low-income nations increased rents by 
these nations’ share of global gross domestic product (20 percent), the innovative effect would be 
far less than what would be required to offset the projected deadweight loss.  F.M. Scherer, A Note 
on Global Welfare in Pharmaceutical Patenting, 27 WORLD ECON. 1127, 1128–29 (2004). 
108. The main costs to such a system would be the cost of accurately identifying the poor and the risk 
of arbitrage.  But implementing a norm in favor of free riding by the poor might not be as 
expensive or difficult as it might seem to be.  Reasonably effective and moderately leaky ways to 
segment rich and poor markets may exist, including targeting institutions that disproportionately 
serve the poor (such as public schools and public libraries in low-income areas), linking the benefit 
of free riding to existing means-testing schemes (such as federal student assistance or Medicaid), 
or using national borders as a rough measure of poverty.  We could also imagine less centralized 
schemes that give information industries tax incentives or that impose regulatory requirements to 
encourage industry to identify and serve low-income users themselves. 
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in developing treatments for conditions such as extensively drug-resistant tubercu-
losis (TB)—the largest impact of which is felt in South Africa.109  No patent 
exception can give patients with this form of TB better access to simple and 
fast-acting medicines, because such medicines do not exist. 
Fundamentally, the point is this: From an internalist perspective, it is poss-
ible to locate areas in which exceptions to IP law will yield distributive advantages 
because they will give the poor much more access and will do little to undermine 
innovation.  But whether this is so will be a function of the state of the relevant 
markets, and it will be orthogonal to the importance of the issue from a distri-
butive justice perspective.  From an external perspective, it becomes clear that 
while such exceptions may not undermine information production, they can also 
do little to support it.  
In other words, using IP to generate innovation will undersupply not just 
access for the poor but also production for the poor.  Yet distributive justice 
plausibly demands not only fair distribution of information goods but also 
equitable production of information goods.110  Suspending price alone can help 
to achieve fairer distribution but not equitable production.  The same pattern will 
be reproduced by all distributive exemptions in IP law whether they come under 
the guise of fair use in the copyright context, the research exemption in patent 
law, or exceptions that deliberately target the poor.  For example, if justice de-
mands that we allocate equal or similar resources to the development of medical 
treatments for both rich and poor people, then using price to drive production 
will misfire: Under conditions of limited ability to pay, price will signal that the 
lives of the wealthy are more important than are the lives of the poor. 
The problem will appear to be the most acute when the rich and the poor 
have different information needs, because here the information goods that the 
  
109. See Sheela Shenoi et al., Multidrug-Resistant and Extensively Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis: Consequences 
for the Global HIV Community, 22 CURRENT OPINIONS INFECTIOUS DISEASES 11, 16 n.7 (2009); 
Why New TB Drugs? MDR-TB, XDR-TB, TB ALLIANCE, http://www.tballiance.org/why/mdr-
xdr.php (last visited Feb. 27, 2012).  Because of the very limited ability of the poor in developing 
countries to pay, very few medicines are developed for diseases that particularly affect them.  For 
example, a recent study revealed that only 1 percent of medications introduced between 1975 and 
1999 targeted tuberculosis and tropical diseases.  Patrice Trouiller et al., Drug Development for 
Neglected Diseases: A Deficient Market and a Public-Health Policy Failure, 359 LANCET 2188, 
2189–90 (2002). 
110. This is not to discount possible arguments that we should give some kind of priority to access to 
existing information, even at the expense of future production.  Such arguments invoke difficult 
questions of interpersonal and intergenerational justice, which are beyond the scope of this project.  
But it is certainly plausible that the production of information is as much an issue of distributive 
justice as is access to existing information, which is all that I mean to suggest here. 
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poor need will not be developed at all.  This is an evident problem in health, in 
which the global poor disproportionately suffer from communicable diseases that 
have little or no impact in the global North.111  But it could also be an issue in 
the cultural domain if, for example, the poor have needs for distinct educational 
goods or political literatures.112  There is also a less visible cost even in those areas 
where the rich and the poor share a need, such as in the area of medicines for 
noncommunicable diseases.  There, relevant information may be produced (say, 
medicines or techniques to reduce blood pressure), but produced more slowly or 
in a smaller supply than it would be if the poor had the same ability as do the 
rich to make their demands felt in the marketplace.113  
Internalism sets a trap for those concerned with distributive justice in infor-
mation policy, requiring the distributive impulse to stay within narrow bounds 
or to become self-defeating.  An externalist approach allows us to look more 
broadly and to see that commons-based and government procurement mechan-
isms may have constitutive advantages over IP from a distributive perspective. 
As Benkler has argued with regard to the commons, justice provides an 
argument for organizing “a substantial component of our communications and 
information environment as a commons, in which nonmarket production can 
take on a more important role.”114  This is because the commons may be as 
efficient as the market at producing information goods (such as encyclope-
dias),115 and because it seems to have inherent distributive advantages.  It will 
have allocative advantages for the poor because goods produced in the commons 
  
111. This point is well made in Fisher & Syed, supra note 65, at 8–10. 
112. One can imagine a range of reasons why this might be so.  For example, the poor might have 
educational disadvantages that require tailored informational products, or they might have espe-
cially acute needs for information about the distribution of wealth or the functioning of the social 
welfare state.  The poor might also have a special interest in the production of class analysis about, 
for example, the structure of education or the possibilities of political mobilization.  See, e.g., 
PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (Myra Bergman Ramos trans., Continuum 
Pub. Co. 1990) (1968); FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE’S 
MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, HOW THEY FAIL (1979). 
113. This does not contradict the internalist point made earlier, that sometimes the poor have more to 
gain in access than they have to lose in innovation.  Precisely because the poor do not have the same 
ability to pay as the rich, large numbers of the global poor can be given access to, say, HIV 
medicines, without substantially undermining the potential private market for treatments for HIV. 
114. Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy of Information, 52 DUKE 
L.J. 1245, 1269 (2003); see also BENKLER, supra note 18, at 303–06 (arguing, in relatively brief 
form, that distributive values should lead us to sometimes prefer commons-based schemes of 
information protection).  
115. Benkler, supra note 114, at 1270; cf. Jim Giles, Internet Encyclopaedias Go Head to Head, 438 
NATURE 900 (2005) (finding that peer reviewers identified almost as many errors in science 
entries in the Encyclopedia Britannica as they identified in Wikipedia). 
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are made available freely to others.  It may also have relative advantages with 
respect to dynamic production because it allocates and produces resources via 
signals that are not closely tied to existing distributions of wealth.116  
Open and collaborative systems also require resource inputs, but they 
mobilize these resources in a different fashion than does the IP approach.  
Some such systems, like Wikipedia or Seti@home, are sustained by voluntary 
contributions of time or resources, and are indirectly subsidized by income 
that such participants glean from elsewhere in their lives.117  Others, such as 
open-source software projects that emerge from universities, are sustained by 
salaries paid by the public.118  Because these motivations are not systematically 
related to consumers’ willingness and ability to pay, we may expect them to 
produce information in a way that is more aligned with what distributive 
justice requires.  I say “may” because whether this will be so depends on what 
in fact motivates such collaborative projects—a subject about which there is 
debate.119  If, for example, volunteer-based projects like Wikipedia are moti-
vated by ingroup solidarity, they may do little to provide information goods 
needed particularly by the poor insofar as the poor are less likely to have the 
time and resources to participate actively in the communities that generate these 
goods.  If these volunteer-based projects are motivated by attempts to benefit 
from reputational advantages, then their dynamic implications in distributive 
terms are still less clear.  Examples of successful open and collaborative inno-
vation projects are also somewhat limited.  It may be possible to create a 
volunteer-driven encyclopedia online, but more difficult to develop new 
medicines in peer-to-peer fashion. 
In distributive terms, the most promising of the alternatives or sup-
plements to the price mechanism is the approach of government procurement.  
Government-sponsored prizes and government contracting facilitate access for 
  
116. Benkler, supra note 114, at 1271. 
117. For a description of Seti@home, see BENKLER, supra note 18, at 81–83. 
118. See generally STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE (2004) (providing a history of 
the open-source software movement). 
119. Compare BENKLER, supra note 18, at 92–127 (arguing that collaborative projects arise from 
networked communities whose motivations often fall outside of rational economic behaviors), and 
Scott Stern, Do Scientists Pay to Be Scientists?, 50 MGMT. SCI. 835, 836 (2004) (analyzing 
empirical data about wages of scientists with multiple job offers, and concluding that scientists have 
a “taste” for the scientific ethos that they are willing to pay for with lesser compensation), with 
Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Some Simple Economics of Open Source, 50 J. INDUS. ECON. 197, 218 
(2002) (emphasizing the role of reputational benefits and concluding that “while some of [the] 
benefits conferred from participation in open source projects may be less concrete in nature, there 
also appear [to] be quite tangible—if delayed—rewards”).  
1002 59 UCLA L. REV. 970 (2012) 
the poor because the information goods that these approaches produce are 
classically not priced.  In dynamic terms, these approaches also can be directly 
organized to meet distributive goals and can be funded through progressive 
taxation.120  While one could also address the distributive costs of price by 
redistributing resources until an equitable allocation is achieved and by allowing 
IP to do its work thereafter, this is not a simple process, nor would it obviously 
be more efficient than simply using mechanisms like prizes.  In the transna-
tional domain, there is no mechanism for taxes and transfers of this sort, which 
helps to explain why prizes have been such a dominant part of the conversation 
about how to allocate more resources toward diseases that disproportionately 
impact the global poor.121  In fact, one of the virtues of prizes is that one can 
implement them without correcting the market for a good first.  This may be 
particularly important in areas with intractable externalities and dim political 
prospects of market reform, such as climate change.122 
It may be easier to see government’s possible role in the effective produc-
tion of science than of culture.123  Yet one of the leading proposals to reorganize 
the production and distribution of music in light of the new potential for cheap 
distribution and reuse via digital networks, offered by William Fisher, recom-
mends that we stimulate production not with price but rather with general 
taxation funds distributed to creators according to their share in online music 
consumption—music which in turn would be free to users.124  This is an 
inducement prize, in which the size of the prize is determined by measuring the 
distribution of the good ex post.  Fisher makes a strong case that such a scheme 
would be superior in efficiency terms to one that uses price as a signal, and a 
scheme such as this would also clearly have salutary distributive effects as long as 
the government tax operated more progressively than price.125 
Moreover, some information goods are of such foundational importance to 
human freedoms and capabilities that we believe that everyone should have 
them regardless of whether they would express a preference for them in market 
  
120. While government taxes also imply some deadweight loss, the deadweight loss associated with IP 
is expected to be greater.  See supra note 62.  
121. See Love & Hubbard, supra note 61; Arjun Jayadev & Joseph Stiglitz, Two Ideas to Increase 
Innovation and Reduce Pharmaceutical Costs and Prices, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS w165 (2008). 
122. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 19, at 4, 41–42 (explaining that prizes are an important tool to promote 
innovation particularly in the context of the failures of attempts to properly price carbon). 
123. After all, government already provides substantial support for the development of science and 
technology.  See, e.g., BOROUSH, supra note 1.  
124. FISHER, supra note 18, at 202. 
125. See id. at 216 (describing the operation of such a system, and assuming it would be based upon the 
existing progressive tax system).  
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settings.  Justice may demand that individuals are provided with education or 
healthcare, for example, whether or not they would choose to purchase these 
goods in a market setting.  Similarly, distributive justice may provide grounds to 
supply a person with access to news channels even if, in a market context, they 
would demonstrate a preference for reality television.  We can call information 
goods that correspond to these capabilities or freedoms “basic” information goods. 
Many prominent theories of distributive justice conclude that individuals 
have entitlements that are independent of what they prefer.  Amartya Sen, for 
example, developed his capabilities-based theory of justice largely through a cri-
tique of preference satisfaction as an appropriate measure of justice.126  As Sen 
points out, preferences may be endogenous, or maladaptive, responding more to 
a history of depredation than to any properly moral account of what individuals 
deserve in a just society.127  John Rawls’s theory of justice similarly addresses 
itself not to individual preferences, but to “primary goods,” which he argues should 
be allocated in such a way as to advance the lot of the worst off.128  Moreover, 
our societal judgment about the importance of free primary and secondary edu-
cation, or, for example, our unwillingness to let people sell themselves or parts 
of their bodies, suggest that we believe that individuals have entitlements to 
certain basic goods irrespective of their preferences.129 
Even in a world with no morally significant distinctions in wealth, then, 
we might conclude that all individuals should have access to certain basic infor-
mation goods.  When this is the case, IP is a problematic way of producing 
information not only because price rations access but, more fundamentally, 
  
126. See Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, in 1 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 195, 
218 (Sterling McMurrin ed., 1980) [hereinafter Sen, Equality of What?]; SEN, supra note 97. 
127. Sen, Equality of What?, supra note 126, at 203.  Sen famously invokes the example of people with 
disabilities: “[I]f person A as a cripple gets half the utility that the pleasure-wizard person B does 
from any given level of income,” he notes, “then in the pure distribution problem between A and 
B the utilitarian would end up giving the pleasure-wizard B more income than the cripple A.”  Id.  
The argument that we must affirmatively support the production and distribution of particularly 
important informational goods could also be made on market failure grounds, cf. C. EDWIN 
BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 3–95 (2002), but because this argument can be 
collapsed into an efficiency account, I leave it aside here. 
128. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 75–76 (1971).  For John Rawls, “primary goods” are 
goods that no rational person would want to do without, such as liberties, income, and self-
respect.  Id. at 62, 90–95. 
129. Molly Van Houweling effectively suggests that creative expression itself should be treated as a 
foundational human capability, and thus it should not be allocated via preferences expressed in 
markets.  See Van Houweling, supra note 89, at 1577–78 (“[W]e do not value speech and creativity 
merely for the utility they generate for willing buyers; so it is not ideal to allocate speech opportunities 
via the market and would not be ideal even if everyone had equal purchasing power.”). 
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because price links production to the expression of preferences in markets.  
From a Demsetzian perspective, IP is preferable to government procurement 
because entrepreneurs, interpreting market signals, are able to best approximate 
the social value of a product.  But by definition, with basic information goods 
we want to sever the relationship between market preferences and production.  
So here, the central virtue of IP is no virtue at all. 
The price mechanism could be retrofitted to address this tension that it 
creates with justice in the production of basic information goods.  For example, 
we might seek to subsidize purchases, and thus the production of basic infor-
mation goods for the poor, by providing means-tested vouchers for the purchase 
of particular information goods.130  Douglas Lichtman has made such a proposal 
in the area of medicines, suggesting that the government provide the poor not 
with income (which could be used to satisfy a variety of preferences), but rather 
with vouchers to supplement the market demand that the poor can manifest 
for medicines.131 
However, there are two substantial difficulties with this approach.  First, 
the government would have to determine how large the vouchers should be—
that is, it would have to somehow discern the true demand function of each 
poor person for drugs like Prozac (for depression) or Advair (for asthma).  To 
call such calculations difficult is to understate the matter.  Second, precisely 
because the voucher system requires this judgment, it compromises the degree 
to which price can serve as a signal that rationalizes and optimizes production 
and distribution, as it does in the conventional account.  Individuals, in disag-
gregated fashion, do not drive demand.  Rather, the decision is made by the size 
of the vouchers, which is determined by the government.  To the extent that we 
modify price to compensate for the fact that it measures the wrong things from 
the perspective of distributive justice, we undermine the accorded virtue of price as 
a signal.  It is not at all obvious why we would want to continue to use price when 
we have already conceded that we must use means other than the market to 
establish the value of the good in question.  In that case, we incur the efficiency 
costs of price—including both deadweight loss and the risk of racing—but not 
  
130. As noted earlier, we could also simply provide means-tested redistribution of resources, so that the 
rich and the poor no longer experience morally relevant differences in their ability to pay.  That 
would make price a far more attractive mechanism from a distributive point of view, but it would 
not sever the relationship between price and preferences, and so it would fail to address the fact 
that we might want to subsidize particular informational goods.  Vouchers can address this, but 
they run into the problems discussed next in this Part. 
131. Douglas Gary Lichtman, Pricing Prozac: Why the Government Should Subsidize the Purchase of 
Patented Pharmaceuticals, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123 (1997). 
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its main efficiency benefit.  Vouchers might address the distributive concern, 
but in a manner less efficient than would more direct modes of government 
procurement.  Because efficiency can have distributive implications—for example, 
it can reduce the resources available to serve the needs of the poor—this is both 
a distributive and an efficiency concern.  
Price cannot both achieve its promise as a signal and meet the demands of 
distributive justice where basic information goods are concerned.  Price may also 
be distributively problematic where nonbasic information goods are concerned if 
the background distribution of resources is unjust.  Assume, for example, that 
popular music is a nonbasic information good.  It does not follow that there is 
no distributive problem with directing its production and distribution through 
the price mechanism.  If music is a good—even if it is a nonbasic good—a case 
can be made on distributive grounds that we should direct its production and 
distribution in a way that is not systematically sensitive to the underlying distri-
bution of wealth, when that distribution is itself unjust, and when alternative 
systems exact no toll in efficiency terms.132  A prize system of the sort that 
Fisher has proposed thus has distributive appeal, even if we do not consider 
music to be a basic information good and even though it directs the production 
of music through the decentralized expression of preferences.133  
An externalist perspective allows distributive justice inquiries a far greater 
scope than does an internalist perspective.  It allows us to see that government 
procurement and the commons (and especially the former) are institutional 
approaches with inherent distributive advantages because they sever the links 
both between ability to pay and production, and when they concern basic infor-
mation goods, between preference and production.  This is not to say that there 
is one ideal framework for information production from the perspective of 
distributive justice, or that price could never be the best system from this 
perspective.  But only once we adopt an externalist perspective can we begin to 
examine the tradeoffs in particular cases.  In some areas, government sponsorship 
  
132. Scotchmer and Nancy Gallini seem to come to the opposite conclusion, arguing that price is 
a mechanism that precisely serves distributive ends, because it puts the costs of innovation 
on users, instead of on taxpayers who “might rightfully revolt if asked to bear the costs of 
developing, say, computer games.”  Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 46, at 55.  But this intuition 
may be funded by the sense that video games are not goods at all, but rather are “bads.”  If we 
can address underlying unjust inequities in access to resources with a more just system of devel-
oping and distributing information—without compromising efficiency—then distributive 
justice may provide a general argument for doing so. 
133. Because Fisher’s scheme would track digital music consumption, it would be sensitive to 
preference.  But it would prevent preference from being systematically influenced by price because 
the music would be free.  FISHER, supra note 18, at 202. 
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of information production may be in tension with other goods that are 
important from a distributive perspective, such as other “primary” goods in the 
Rawlsian scheme or goods important to capabilities according to Sen.  For 
example, government provisioning of political news is plausibly in tension with 
values of free speech.  Whether and when this will be the case and how we 
should make tradeoffs between, say, the risk of government interference and the 
possibility of better meeting the informational needs of the poor are complex 
questions that require contextual analysis.  My aim here is not to adjudicate the 
debate between mechanisms in distributive terms, but rather to make clear that 
this debate is one very much worth having.  And it can only be had if we first 
broaden our perspective to bring approaches beyond IP more centrally into view. 
III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EXTERNALISM AND THE COST 
OF PRICE TO INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY 
An externalist view can also yield new insights into the relationship between 
different institutional approaches to cultural and scientific production and infor-
mational privacy—insights that are not visible from within an internalist account.  
Taking an externalist view allows us to ask not only whether we should adjust 
IP law in some way to accommodate privacy interests,134 but also whether some 
approaches to scientific and cultural production are constitutively more likely 
than others to conflict with the desire to protect informational privacy. 
Asking the question this way makes it possible to see that IP, as a strat-
egy, imposes a cost on privacy—a cost that other institutional approaches do not 
impose.  As I show in this Part, choosing IP as a means to produce infor-
mation sets up a certain logic: The imposition of price triggers the problem of 
deadweight loss, and in response we call for price discrimination—that is, for 
sellers of information goods not just to set one or a few price tiers, but to charge 
each individual user according to her willingness and ability to pay.  We want 
  
134. For important work in this vein, see, for example, Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence 
of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089 (1998) (invoking privacy values, among others, in 
justifying a “right to hack,” that is, to breach digital fences to exercise entitlements granted by 
copyright law); Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright 
Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996) [hereinafter Cohen, Right to Read] 
(describing conflicts between privacy values and digital rights management, and arguing that the 
First Amendment should be read to create limits on the scope of digital rights management); 
Sonia K. Katyal, Privacy v. Piracy, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 222 (2004–2005) (drawing attention to 
conflicts between online copyright enforcement efforts and privacy, and arguing for, among other 
things, changes to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s enforcement provisions to accom-
modate privacy interests). 
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price discrimination on efficiency grounds once we commit to IP as a strategy, 
and because information often has a high fixed cost but invariably has zero 
marginal cost, producers are also likely to be motivated to price discriminate.   
Exclusive rights may also give producers a measure of market power that 
facilitates price discrimination.  The impulse toward price discrimination is in 
tension with informational privacy for a simple reason: Personal information is 
critical to the ability to cheaply and accurately price discriminate.  Price is more 
attractive if we have less informational privacy; conversely, the more we value 
privacy, the less attractive price is as a strategy for producing and distributing 
information.  There is reason to think, moreover, that government procurement 
and commons-based strategies are less in structural tension with privacy values, 
as I explain below.  
Again, we should begin with an account of the value of informational pri-
vacy.  There are two main competing conceptions of informational privacy in 
the legal literature today.  The first depicts informational privacy as an autonomy 
or dignity right to control the exchange and processing of information about 
oneself.135  To illustrate the importance of that control, scholars point out that los-
ing it can increase vulnerability to discrimination,136 to harassment and stalking,137 
to embarrassment,138 and to identify theft.139  
The second main conception, associated most closely with scholars such as 
Robert Post, Paul Schwartz, and Julie Cohen, sees privacy not as an individual 
right of control, but rather as a collective entitlement that protects a range of 
social and political values.140  Those that reason in this constitutive vein point 
  
135. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1203 
(1998); see also ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) (defining privacy generally 
as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to 
what extent information about them is communicated to others”). 
136. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information 
Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1424 (2001) (noting that decisions about loans, jobs, and 
licenses can be based on information collected in databases). 
137. See id. at 1428–29 (recounting instances in which database retailers processed or sold information 
in ways that jeopardized individual safety); Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 
WASH. L. REV. 119, 147 (2004) (describing this problem, and recalling the case of a woman who 
was murdered by someone who located her address through DMV records). 
138. See, e.g., Kang, supra note 135, at 1212. 
139. Id. at 1215; Nissenbaum, supra note 137, at 147. 
140. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. 
L. REV. 1373, 1426–27 (2000) [hereinafter Cohen, Examined Lives]; Cohen, Right to Read, supra 
note 134, at 982; Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Property: Community and Self in the 
Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 959 (1989); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and 
Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1664–66 (1999). 
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out, for example, that privacy norms facilitate robust public debate, because 
when “surveillance becomes the norm, the act of speaking or listening takes on a 
different social meaning.”141  As Neil Richards puts it:  
Surveillance or interference can warp the integrity of our freedom of 
thought and can skew the way we think, with clear repercussions for 
the content of our subsequent speech or writing.  The ability to freely 
make up our minds and to develop new ideas thus depends upon a 
substantial measure of intellectual privacy.142   
Proponents of a constitutive understanding of information privacy also 
argue that privacy norms construct, rather than simply reflect, individual 
preferences and choices.  For example, they note that when personal informa-
tion is used to profile individuals online and then to target particular content 
or advertising back to a person, this has the result of reflecting back to the 
individual an image of him or herself.  This generates the worry that the facts 
selected may become disproportionately salient to the person herself or himself 
as well as to others.143  The implication is that we cannot simply defer to individual 
  
141. Schwartz, supra note 140, at 1651; see also Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 140, at 1426 (noting 
that the “autonomy fostered by informational privacy . . . is an indispensable condition for 
reasoned participation in the governance of the community and its constituent institutions”); Ruth 
Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980) (noting that privacy 
promotes “liberty, autonomy, selfhood, and human relations, and further[s] the existence of a free 
society”); Nissenbaum, supra note 137, at 150 (“[P]rivacy is essential to nourishing and promoting 
the values of a liberal, democratic, political, and social order [because] the vitality of democracy 
depends not only on an autonomous and thoughtful citizenry—bolstered through privacy—but 
on the concrete protection against public scrutiny of certain spheres of decision-making . . . .”). 
142. Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 389 (2008); see also Cohen, DRM 
and Privacy, supra note 23, at 577–80 (similarly defending a view of intellectual privacy related to 
rights to integrity and self-definition); Cohen, Right to Read, supra note 134, at 982 (“A 
fundamental assumption underlying our discourse about the activities of reading, thinking, and 
speech is that individuals in our society are guaranteed the freedom to form their thoughts and opin-
ions in privacy, free from intrusive oversight from governmental or private entities.”); Kang, supra 
note 135, at 1260 (stating that surveillance can lead to alienation and self-censorship); Nissenbaum, 
supra note 137, at 148–49 (“[F]reedom from scrutiny and zones of ‘relative insularity’ are necessary 
conditions for formulating goals, values, conceptions of self, and principles of action because they 
provide venues in which people are free to experiment, act, and decide without giving account to oth-
ers or being fearful of retribution.”); Solove, supra note 136, at 1418 (“The mere knowledge that one’s 
behavior is being monitored and recorded certainly can lead to self-censorship and inhibition.”). 
143. See Kenneth L. Karst, “The Files”: Legal Controls Over the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored Personal 
Data, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 342, 361 (1966); see also Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Exploring 
Identity and Identification in Cyberspace, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 1085, 
1100–01 (2000) (arguing that profiling “reinforce[s] assessments and decisions made in the past,” and 
seeks to reduce individuals to a set of “measurable characteristics”); Solove, supra note 136, at 1425 
(“[I]nformation in databases often fails to capture the texture of our lives.  Rather than provide 
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preferences because those preferences are shaped by, rather than separable from, 
the environment in which they are formed.  
These two conceptions of the value of privacy have evident and important 
differences.  For example, the consent view seems to suggest that we should 
allow people freely to choose surveillance, and thus to sell their right to privacy 
in the marketplace.144  The constitutive view instead requires us to construct a 
social and political vision of the subjects we want to call forth, and then design 
privacy protections accordingly.145  But given the evident imperfections in the 
market for informational privacy, in practice both views suggest that protecting 
informational privacy requires more than relying on formal individual consent.  
As many have now recognized, transaction costs and information asymmetries 
clearly bedevil markets for private information.  For example, websites have a 
myriad of different privacy policies, meaning that individuals who value privacy 
may have a difficult time understanding what they are giving up by using certain 
sites.146  Recent survey data confirms that fact, showing that most individuals 
have little understanding of what companies’ privacy policies in fact mean.147  
Privacy policies could be clarified and standardized, thus lowering the cost of 
understanding them.  But individuals will still face very substantial information 
requirements prior to making an informed choice to give up private informa-
tion, and many of these requirements will be difficult to eliminate.  For example, 
people need to understand the variety of ways in which their personal information 
could be used, as well as what implications such uses carry, in a fast-moving 
context in which new uses and markets are constantly emerging.  Today, much 
of the value of an individual bit of information depends upon whether and how 
it is aggregated with other information, which thereby compounds the prob-
lem.148  Finally, individual choices also have social implications, as the constitutive 
view makes clear.  These effects can be modeled as externalities that individuals 
  
a nuanced portrait of our personalities, they capture the stereotypes and the brute facts of what we do 
without the reasons.”). 
144. See, e.g., Kang, supra note 135; see also Solove, supra note 136, at 1446 (arguing that there is a 
strong association between the consent conception and the idea that private information is a form 
of property that can be alienated in markets). 
145. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 140, at 1614–15 (arguing for the importance of legally estab-
lished “fair information practices” that would provide “defined obligations that limit the use of 
personal data” as well as procedural and substantive rights, transparency requirements, and 
accountability mechanisms). 
146. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 160 (1999). 
147. See Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jennifer King, What Californians Understand About Privacy 
Online (2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1262130. 
148. See Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 140, at 1397–98; Solove, supra note 136, at 1452. 
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are unlikely to take into account when making a decision to yield privacy, thus 
yielding a conventional argument for third-party intervention by government, 
for example.149  
It is plain that the networked digital age has brought with it substantial 
new challenges to information privacy, whether that value is conceived in terms of 
control or in a more constitutive fashion.  Recent years have seen unprecedented 
advances in the tracking, compiling, and exchanging of personal data.  Everything  
that we do on digital networks—using a search engine, perusing a website, reading a 
few pages on Google Books, plugging an appliance into a smart grid, making 
a phone call, watching television—can be readily tracked.150  As importantly, 
advances in computing power mean that it is increasingly easy to archive, search, 
exchange, integrate, and compile such data into dossiers with ever more 
comprehensive information about individuals.151  These new capabilities have 
generated enormous new business opportunities for data mining and data profil-
ing companies.152  Recently, computer scientists have undermined confidence in 
  
149. Ronald Coase’s famous argument about the possibility of bargaining around legal rules is 
notwithstanding, because here transaction costs would surely be high, given (for example) the 
numerosity of consumers and their aforementioned informational deficits. 
150. On search engine tracking, see, for example, James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine 
Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1, 17–20 (2007); Search Engine Privacy, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. 
CTR., http://epic.org/privacy/search_engine (last visited Feb. 28, 2012).  On clickstream 
tracking, see, for example, Solove, supra note 136, at 1411–12.  On potential privacy issues related 
to Google Books, see, for example, Jonathan Band, The Long and Winding Road to the Google 
Books Settlement, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 227, 306–11 (2009); Letter on 
Reader Privacy and Google Book Search From Cindy Cohn, Legal Dir., Elec. Frontier 
Found., Nicole A. Ozer, Tech. & Civil Liberties Dir., ACLU of N. Cal. & Jennifer Lynch, 
Lecturer in Residence & Supervising Attorney, Samuelson Law, Tech. & Pub. Policy 
Clinic, to Eric Schmidt, Chairman and CEO, Google Inc. (July 23, 2009), available at 
http://www.eff.org/files/gbs_privacy_schmidt_letter.pdf.  On privacy issues related to smart grids 
(electrical grids that use two-way digital connections to monitor and control appliances in homes to 
conserve energy), see Joint Comments of the Center for Democracy & Technology and the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation on Proposed Policies and Findings Pertaining to the Smart Grid (Dec. 18, 
2008), available at http://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/20100309_smartgrid_cpuc_comments.pdf.  
Transactional data about phone calls have long been tracked by phone companies, but digitali-
zation has made call-related information much easier to track.  See Ira S. Rubinstein et al., Data 
Mining and Internet Profiling: Emerging Regulatory and Technological Approaches, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 261, 281 (2008).  Finally, on the privacy implications of digital networked television tech-
nologies such as TiVo, see Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 2055, 2127–28 (2004). 
151. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 1–2 (2004); Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 140, at 1374. 
152. See Solove, supra note 136, at 1404–09 (describing the development of the direct marketing 
industry and the importance of voluminous data collection about individual patterns, demographics, 
and “psychographic” information to that industry). 
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our ability to protect privacy in these databases while also exchanging and 
making use of such databases, demonstrating that it is much easier than was 
previously assumed to produce identifiable information from databases presumed 
to be anonymous.153  The result is a “growing disparity between what individuals 
know about the organizations whose actions influence their lives and what these 
organizations know about them.”154  
What does all of this mean for information policy?  Adopting an externalist 
perspective, we can begin by investigating the structural implications of relying 
on the institutional approach of IP for informational privacy.  When we do, it 
becomes clear that price in the context of information generates a tension with 
informational privacy—one that stems from the relationship that exists between 
price, price discrimination, and privacy.155  As described in Part I, using price as 
a mechanism to generate and distribute information goods generates the problem 
of deadweight loss.  Perfect price discrimination can eliminate deadweight loss, 
and in so doing, can enhance efficiency.  In reality, price discrimination can only 
  
153. See, e.g., Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Robust De-anonymization of Large Sparse 
Datasets, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2008 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY 
111 (2008); Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010).  As Paul Ohm describes, “How many other 
people in the United States share your specific combination of ZIP code, birth date (including 
year), and sex?  According to a landmark study, for 87 percent of the American population, the 
answer is zero; these three pieces of information uniquely identify each of them.”  Id. at 1705.  Thus, 
if a database were stripped of traditional personally identifiable information, such as names and 
social security numbers, but included these three kinds of information, a person who knew these 
things would be able to access whatever other information the database revealed for the vast majority 
of people.  They could also associate this data with a personal name if they happen to know the 
name of the person with these three characteristics (for example, if they are looking up a friend), 
or if—as has happened—they are able to obtain a personal name from some other source, such as 
voter rolls.  Id. at 1719–20.   
154. Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Legitimate Business Interest: No End in Sight? An Inquiry Into the Status of 
Privacy in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 77, 77–78. 
155. Andrew Odlyzko makes a broader argument that has been helpful to my thinking here.  He 
contends that “the powerful movement to reduce privacy [on the Internet] that is coming from 
the private sector is motivated by the incentives to price discriminate.”  Andrew Odlyzko, 
Privacy, Economics, and Price Discrimination on the Internet, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 355, 356 (2003), available at 
http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=948051.  Odlyzko does not focus on information, but 
focuses on other domains with high fixed and low marginal costs, primarily nineteenth century 
railroads.  Id.  My contribution is to draw on the broader arguments offered by Odlyzko, as well 
the work of scholars such as Hal Varian, see infra note 156, to connect these insights to the IP 
literature and to make the point (novel, to my knowledge) that other institutional approaches to 
information production may generate less tension with privacy values. 
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be imperfect, but even imperfect price discrimination is predicted often to 
enhance efficiency.156  
Moreover, to provide information through the price mechanism is to gen-
erate a decentralized impulse toward price discrimination on the part of infor-
mation providers.  Information goods may often have high fixed cost and will 
invariably have zero marginal cost.  As such, “price discrimination may be an 
especially attractive tactic in information markets.”157  In general, producers have 
an incentive to price discriminate when marginal willingness to pay is higher than 
marginal cost, because this will increase profits.158  When marginal cost is zero, 
this scenario will always occur.  Moreover, when fixed costs are high but marginal 
costs are low, firms may need to price discriminate in order to sustain their busi-
ness models.159 
Price in the context of information requires exclusive rights, so it also may 
give firms a measure of market power that helps them to successfully price discri-
minate.  While it is commonly said that market power is necessary for price 
discrimination, today there is a substantial literature showing that price discrim-
ination is also possible in imperfectly competitive markets.160  Many examples of 
  
156. See, e.g., Lars A. Stole, Price Discrimination in Competitive Environments, in 3 HANDBOOK OF 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 2221 (Mark Armstrong & Robert H. Porter eds., 2007) 
(reviewing the efficiency implications of price discrimination); Hal R. Varian, Price Discrimination 
and Social Welfare, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 870 (1985) (arguing that third-degree price discrim-
ination will increase efficiency when it leads to an increase in output); see also William W. Fisher 
III, When Should We Permit Differential Pricing of Information?, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1, 22–27 
(2007) (explaining Hal Varian’s point, and noting that this insight, as well as further consid-
erations of externalities and legal prohibitions, requires us to consider the efficiency of price 
discrimination in particularized context).  Note that insofar as we are ambivalent about the effects 
of imperfect, and particularly third-degree, price discrimination, this simply makes first-degree 
price discrimination—which is the most information-intensive form—more attractive. 
157. HAL R. VARIAN, JOSEPH FARRELL & CARL SHAPIRO, THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 73 (2004); see also Hal R. Varian, Differential Pricing 
and Efficiency, FIRST MONDAY, Aug. 9, 1996, http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ 
ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/473/829 [hereinafter Varian, Differential Pricing]. 
158. Varian, Differential Pricing, supra note 157, at 4. 
159. Id. 
160. See, e.g., Stole, supra note 156, at 2224.  Interestingly, some have argued that in imperfectly 
competitive markets, price discrimination may in fact benefit consumers and harm producers, 
because price discrimination has not only the effect of capturing more consumer welfare, but 
also of increasing competition.  See, e.g., Rosa Brance Esteves, A Survey on the Economics of 
Behaviour-Based Price Discrimination 4–5 (NIPE Working Paper 5, 2009), available at 
http://www3.eeg.uminho.pt/economia/nipe/docs/2009/NIPE_WP_5_2009.pdf; Jacques-François 
Thisse & Xavier Vives, On the Strategic Choice of Spatial Price Policy, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 122, 
124 (1988).  If that were the case, we would not expect firms to have an incentive to price 
discriminate.  But this same literature also shows that firms may be locked into a prisoner’s 
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price discrimination can in fact be identified in industries that are thought to have 
reasonably competitive markets, such as air travel.161  Moreover, examples from 
informational markets are often used to illustrate the practice of price discrim-
ination, such as the sale of hardcover and paperback versions of books, as well as 
what is called “windowing” in the movie industry, both of which exact higher 
prices from individuals who are more impatient and thus who appear to value a 
good more highly.162 
In the area of information, then, when we use price we are particularly 
likely (1) to want price discrimination because it is expected to increase efficiency; 
(2) to trigger decentralized efforts on the part of firms to price discriminate; and 
(3) to give firms some degree of market power that will facilitate price discrim-
ination.  Two more things are necessary, though, before firms can effectively price 
discriminate: (1) information about consumers’ willingness and ability to pay, and 
(2) the ability to prevent arbitrage between consumers.163  This is where conflicts 
with informational privacy arise.  
The need to determine willingness to pay inherently is in tension with infor-
mational privacy because personal information is critical to the ability to cheaply 
and accurately price discriminate.164  Economists identify three broad strategies 
for price discrimination: (1) first-degree price discrimination, in which a firm 
seeks to charge each customer according to her willingness to pay; (2) second-
degree price discrimination, in which a firm does not directly observe consumer 
heterogeneity but rather uses strategies such as versioning to allow consumers to 
self-select into the relevant groups; and (3) third-degree price discrimination, in 
which a firm charges customers based on some observable fact that is associated 
with consumer valuation (such as student status).165 
Each of these techniques has privacy implications.  The privacy implications 
are more serious with first- and third-degree price discrimination strategies 
  
dilemma, engaging in price discrimination because they anticipate that other firms will do the 
same.  See id. 
161. See, e.g., Varian, Differential Pricing, supra note 157, at 7. 
162. Id. (discussing publishing); Fisher, supra note 156, at 5 (describing windowing, in which studios 
release movies sequentially in theaters, on pay-per-view, on DVD, and finally on network and 
then local television, with price paid per viewing decreasing along the way). 
163. See Fisher, supra note 156, at 3–4. 
164. See Odlyzko, supra note 155, at 356.  
165. See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 364–73 (3d ed. 
1995); see also Esteves, supra note 160, at 2 (describing some of the variations in how second-
degree price discrimination is described).  Versioning is common, for example, in the software 
industry: Software is released in slightly different editions that are sold for different prices, in order 
to induce consumers to sort themselves according to the value they place on the good.  See id. 
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because these strategies are based on direct observations of individual charac-
teristics.  Only with substantial access to personal information can companies 
approach first-degree price discrimination, the most profitable and efficient of the 
three forms of price discrimination.166  Much of the information that firms would 
want in order to estimate willingness to pay will implicate informational privacy—
information like “incomes, wealth, tastes, purchasing habits, and credit histo-
ries.”167  While first-degree price discrimination was long treated in the economics 
literature as unrealistic, there is growing evidence that new technological capabili-
ties have led companies to use specific, personal information about purchases to 
condition their pricing strategies.168  Some observers of the digital environment 
have concluded that “[e]rosion of privacy and improved IT systems will enable a 
close approximation” of first-degree price discrimination to be achieved.169  
Third-degree price discrimination also requires personal information, such as 
information about student status, age, or other characteristics that locate one in the 
relevant price cohort.  Second-degree price discrimination does not depend upon 
firms directly observing qualities of consumers, and so it does not require firms to 
gather the same kind of private information.  It may generate private information, 
though, such as the information that might be collected through a two-part tariff 
system that offers consumers a fixed rate to sign up for a service (say, to watch 
movies online), as well as a per-use rate for each unit of the good consumed. 
The digital age has also dramatically increased the possibility of gathering, 
exchanging, and processing certain forms of personal information, as is described 
above.  Many providers of information goods will be in no better a position 
to gather the needed data than are providers of more conventional commod-
  
166. See Odlyzko, supra note 155, at 357. 
167. Fisher, supra note 156, at 37 (also noting that first-degree price discrimination may foster invasions 
of privacy).  An alternative strategy to reach first-degree price discrimination would be an auction, 
in which individual willingness to pay is measured not via proxies, but rather directly, through 
offers to purchase.  Auctions have fewer privacy implications than do the more common efforts 
to approximate willingness to pay by amassing personal information about people. All that an 
auctioneer learns is how much you value the good, not how much you earn, where you went to 
college, which movies you watched this month, and so forth.  But auctions are rarely a realistic 
option, in part because they are costly to effectively arrange.  See Odlyzko, supra note 155, at 357 
(noting that auction mechanisms are hard to set up, and that “[i]t is easier and more productive to 
just charge more to those able to pay more, if one can”); cf. Charles Noussair, Stephane Robin 
& Bernard Ruffieux, The Effect of Transaction Costs on Double Auction Markets, 36 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 221, 222–23 (1998) (showing theoretically that where continuous double 
auctions are affected by transaction costs, efficiency will be compromised). 
168. See, e.g., Alessandro Acquisti & Hal R. Varian, Conditioning Prices on Purchase History, 24 MARKETING 
SCI. 367, 367 (2005). 
169. Odlyzko, supra note 155, at 357. 
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ities.  For example, pharmaceutical companies and band-aid companies may 
face similar (though in both cases possibly declining) barriers to obtaining 
accurate information about individual health status and income.  But to the extent 
that information providers have more rents to gain than do providers of goods in 
competitive commodity markets, and to the extent that information providers 
enjoy the kind of market power that might allow them to negotiate with consum-
ers for personal information (as pharmaceutical companies do with their patient 
assistance programs),170 they will have more incentive and ability to seek such 
information than do producers of ordinary commodities. 
Some providers of information goods also have a special advantage in 
tracking customer behavior: those whose wares are distributed via the same digital 
networked environment that has allowed the recent revolution in the intimate 
tracking of consumer behavior.  A drug or band-aid company might want to 
know exactly how consumers use their products once they have taken them home, 
but a company that sells real-time streaming video may have the technological 
capability to find out.  
To successfully price discriminate, firms must also be able to limit arbitrage.  
Especially when information goods are concerned, efforts to do this may be in 
tension with privacy.  One common strategy to prevent arbitrage in the 
information context is to deploy technological restrictions referred to as “digital 
rights management” (DRM) techniques.171  DRM comes in many forms, some 
of which facilitate direct technological surveillance of individuals by allowing 
firms to track how individuals use information goods—which has evident 
implications for privacy.172  Other kinds of DRM, like the content scramble 
system code that prevents DVD watchers from copying or fast-forwarding 
through copyright notices, simply prevent users from doing certain things with 
  
170. These programs require individuals to divulge detailed personal information about 
income and household size, and sometimes also about assets and medical history, in 
exchange for possible discounts.  For a sampling of some programs and their requirements, see 
Participating Patient Assistance Programs, PARTNERSHIP FOR PRESCRIPTION ASSISTANCE, 
http://www.pparx.org/en/prescription_assistance_programs/list_of_participating_programs (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2012).  
171. See Odlyzko, supra note 155, at 358 (associating the desire to price discriminate with new motives 
to impose DRM, as well as with “the spread of licensing as opposed to outright sales, and in tying 
arrangements”). 
172. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, supra note 23, at 585 (“Gathering information about intellectual 
consumption renders intellectual preferences accessible, both to the information provider and to 
third parties that might purchase it or invoke legal process to compel its production.”). 
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information goods.173  These have less straightforward privacy implications, but 
they nonetheless raise concerns that can be expressed in the rubric of privacy.174 
Finally, we might expect the desire to control arbitrage in the context of 
information goods to lead producers to shift from a commodity model of infor-
mation distribution toward a services model.  Services are more difficult to resell 
or exchange with others than are commodities.  So, “haircuts, physical examina-
tions, or legal advice, are likely examples of goods for which price discrimination 
is possible because of the obvious difficulty in reselling them or in making 
multiple purchases.”175  This provides a new perspective on the recent interest 
among information providers in moving to service-based models, like the Netflix 
streaming model for providing access to video content, or the cloud-computing 
model of providing software services.176  If these shifts permit more effective 
price discrimination, they may enhance efficiency.  At the same time, in the digi-
tal networked age, service-based models yield unprecedented possibilities for 
surveillance because they give information providers a much more direct ability 
to track individual behavior than do more material forms of distribution. 
Some might suspect that this relationship between price, price 
discrimination, and privacy will be short-circuited by the impracticality of 
price discrimination.  Consumers famously react strongly to some kinds of price 
discrimination—a commonly cited example is the revolt that followed when 
Amazon sought to use its vast trove of customer data to engage in dynamic 
pricing, apparently charging repeat users higher prices than new customers.177  
But price discrimination can be done in many less transparent ways, such as 
“bundling and loyalty programs, which tend to disguise the actual price that 
is charged.”178  Versioning is a tactic of this sort, as occurs when publishers 
  
173. Id. at 580. 
174. As Julie Cohen puts it, “Technologies that constrain user behavior narrow the zone of freedom 
traditionally enjoyed for activities in private spaces, and in particular for activities relating to intellec-
tual consumption within those spaces.”  Id.  This conception of privacy implies a “zone of noninter-
ference with individual choice” that Cohen argues applies to intellectual goods, at least in private 
spaces.  Id. at 582–83. 
175. Kathleen Carroll & Dennis Coates, Teaching Price Discrimination: Some Clarification, 66 S. ECON. 
J. 466, 471 (1999). 
176. This is not to suggest that information services are impermeable to attempts to capture and exchange 
the implicated information, of course.  But they may increase the costs of reselling information. 
177. See Fisher, supra note 156, at 11–12 (describing the Amazon experiment and the fierce consumer 
reaction to it).  As Fisher also recounts, “In 2005, the Annenberg Center surveyed 1500 adult 
Internet users concerning their views of online marketing practices.  Eighty-seven percent disagreed 
with the proposition that ‘it’s OK if an online store I use charges different people different prices 
for the same products during the same hour . . . .’”  Id. at 12. 
178. Odlyzko, supra note 155, at 358. 
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sell hardcover and paperback editions of books, or when software companies sell 
versions of software with different capabilities (for example, professional and 
student versions).179  Sellers can also offer discounts rather than surcharges—
offering consumers specific-to-them lower prices, rather than specific-to-them 
higher prices.180  Although consumers respond more favorably to the discounts, 
they ultimately have the same effect as do the surcharges, because those who are 
not offered discounts are charged a higher baseline price.  
Once price is adopted as an organizing principle, if we are to render the 
distribution and production of information goods efficient, we must coun-
tenance tracking of individual preferences and behaviors, as well as strong forms 
of encryption and other systems to control information goods once they reach 
consumers.  Thus, substantial implications for privacy are bundled into the 
bargain that proposes price as the best means to generate information goods.  
The more we rely on price and seek to gain its benefits, the more pressure we 
put on values of informational privacy. 
Note that we cannot resolve the tension between privacy and price from 
a perspective that is internal to the design of IP law.  Some exceptions in IP 
law do serve purposes related to privacy, such as personal use exceptions 
in copyright.181  Exempted personal uses can include time-shifting (for example, 
recording a television show to watch at a different time) and private displays; they 
are sometimes defended explicitly as means of protecting privacy.182  But even a 
very robust personal use exemption can, at best, address only one small part of 
the potential conflict between price and privacy.  It can do little to alter the basic 
incentive structure that price sets up for the gathering of information relevant to 
price discrimination.  If we conceive of DRM as implicating privacy interests, 
we might give individuals a right to hack it, or we might urge or require 
technology companies to design DRM that is minimally privacy invasive.183  But 
again, this is at best a partial remediation of a more systemic tension. 
A comprehensive privacy law imposed by statute could provide a more 
robust solution to the tension, and it certainly could create an external check on 
  
179. See Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, Versioning: The Smart Way to Sell Information, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Nov.–Dec. 1998, at 106. 
180. See Acquisti & Varian, supra note 168, at 367. 
181. See 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 5.0 (2d ed. 1996) (describing exempted 
personal uses in U.S. law). 
182. See, e.g., Adolph Dietz, Germany, in 2 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 
§ 8[2][a], 8[2][f] (Paul Edward Geller ed., 2009). 
183. See Cohen, Right to Read, supra note 134, at 1037–38; Cohen, DRM and Privacy, supra note 23, 
611–12.  
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the dynamic identified above.  Just how much of an impact such a law would 
have would depend upon the nature of the law.  The dynamics established by 
the institutional approach of IP would also create substantial incentives to cir-
cumvent the law.  Even in the presence of such a law, therefore, the implications 
of the IP approach might nonetheless raise concerns for privacy.  The point 
here, as above, is to make the issue visible so that more fine-grained analysis is 
possible, not to resolve in favor of one approach to scientific and cultural produc-
tion in the abstract. 
Is there reason to think that alternatives to the price mechanism could 
generate less tension with informational privacy, however?  Yes, although the case 
is more qualified than in the domain of distributive justice, and it requires close 
attention to design questions. 
Consider first the privacy implications of government provisioning: When 
setting up a system of prizes or contracts, government agents must determine 
which information goods to produce and how much to spend.  Insofar as they 
seek to do this through some measure of what people want or need, this, too, 
will have implications for informational privacy.  For example, Fisher’s prize 
scheme for music would make use of sampling techniques like those developed 
by Nielsen Media Research to sample digital plays of songs and to compensate 
artists accordingly.184  Such systems would give government actors detailed infor-
mation about music consumption of some sample of people, and they would 
thus implicate privacy concerns.  Fisher suggests that the system be designed to 
minimize these concerns—for example, by ensuring that the government receives 
only aggregate data.185  Notably, this form of a prize (which is more intensive in 
its surveillance than are more conventional prizes) also requires information only 
about music demand and does not require the kind of wide-ranging personal 
information necessary to price discriminate.  The IP system encourages more 
pervasive consumer surveillance than does a system like Fisher’s because it creates 
a demand for information not just about the popularity of information goods, 
but also about individual willingness and ability to pay.  Price thus plausibly 
incentivizes a different and more intrusive kind of gathering of personal infor-
mation than does government procurement. 
In the context of medicines, government valuations for prizes might be 
based on an ex post measure of consumption that is analogous to the Fisher 
proposal.  Again, this requires some government access to personal information, 
  
184. See FISHER, supra note 18, at 226–28. 
185. Id. at 228. 
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but that information need not be personally identifiable.  Prizes for vaccines or 
antibiotics could also instead be based upon public health statistics about 
morbidity and mortality, as well as upon estimations of the costs of R&D.  
These would require less personal information from consumers than would the 
kind of efforts that a pharmaceutical company might invest in when seeking to 
implement a robust plan of price discrimination. 
Finally, government provisioning is undertaken by a centralized and 
formally accountable public actor, whereas price discrimination occurs in a more 
decentralized and private fashion.  A centralized government scheme for col-
lecting information might be easier to observe and to render accountable.  The 
data-gathering and exchange practices of private firms are notoriously diverse 
and complex, making policing and accountability perhaps more difficult than 
they would be if governmental data collection were involved.  Thus, there are 
reasons to think that government procurement schemes have advantages over 
price from a privacy perspective. 
The practices that fall under the rubric of commons-based production are 
also diverse, and therefore they are difficult to assess in the abstract.  But if we 
consider the structure of commons-based production, there seems to be no 
obvious relationship between this mode of production and informational 
privacy.  Hobbyists and user-driven innovators are motivated by their own aims 
and interests, rather than through an other-regarding assessment of demand 
for information goods.  Some commons-based producers, whether they are open-
source software programmers or aspiring musicians and artists, may wish to 
track how their work is being taken up; however, they are likely to have 
relatively limited tools and resources at their disposal to engage in extensive 
surveillance.  There are sophisticated players in the commons-based production 
space, such as Wikipedia, but there is also some reason to think that they are 
likely to be more sensitive to privacy concerns than are conventional firms.  
For example, their production model may be exceptionally sensitive to their 
public reputation and to user goodwill.  Perhaps it is no accident, then, that 
when the Wall Street Journal examined the privacy practices of the fifty most 
popular websites in the United States, the website with the most favorable 
privacy practices was Wikipedia.186  It was the only site examined that did not put 
tracking files on users’ computers to gather information about their browsing 
activity, and it was the only one to receive a “0” score on the privacy exposure 
  
186. What They Know, WALL ST. J. BLOGS—WHAT THEY KNOW, http://blogs.wsj.com/wtk (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2012). 
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index developed by the newspaper, which evaluated practices like usage of cookies 
and sharing and retention of data.187 
The two websites with the most aggressive practices with respect to pri-
vacy were dictionary.com and merriam-webster.com.188  Each website put more 
than two hundred separate tracking files on users’ computers to gather infor-
mation about their browsing activity, and each sold or shared this information 
with at least fifty other companies.189  This suggests that there is yet another 
mode of information production besides those we have discussed so far, and 
that the commons, government procurement, and even IP may have advan-
tages over this mode of production from a privacy perspective.  Websites such as 
dictionary.com, in effect, use a market nonexclusion strategy to fund the produc-
tion of information goods.190  That is, they produce information goods and 
make them freely available without exclusion.  But unlike in a commons, these 
producers are driven by market motives.  In a sense, this is the world of infor-
mation production that the standard economic story discounts, in which neither 
exclusivity nor some other direct subsidy is needed to sustain the production of 
information.  Rather, information is produced by market mechanisms without 
exclusion because some ancillary good or service that is attached to the infor-
mation can be sold.  Dictionary.com, in fact, follows a popular online business 
model: It makes information available for free, and it monetizes its production 
and provision indirectly by gathering and selling the personal information of 
users.191  This strategy produces evident pressure on informational privacy—
a pressure that appears more acute than that produced by government 
procurement, commons-based approaches, and possibly IP too. 
Again, my aim is not to show that one of the possible mechanisms will 
invariably have advantages over the others with respect to privacy.  There might 
be reason to conclude that even minimal government collection and processing  
 
  
187. Tracking the Trackers: Our Method, WALL ST. J. BLOGS—WHAT THEY KNOW (July 31, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703977004575393121635952084.html; see also 
What They Know, supra note 186.  The sites with high-rated exposure were sites like dictionary.com 
and comcast.net, which used 254 and 151 trackers, respectively.  Id. 
188. See What They Know, supra note 186.  
189. See id.  For a more detailed description of the method of the study, see Tracking the Trackers, supra 
note 187. 
190. See BENKLER, supra note 18, at 43. 
191. See Solove, supra note 136, at 1448 (“Many web sites require people to supply personal 
information in order to gain access to information on the web site. . . . In short, useful infor-
mation and services are being exchanged for personal information, and this represents the going 
‘price’ of privacy.”). 
The Cost of Price 1021 
of data about demand for information goods is more troubling than more inten-
sive collection of personal information by private actors.  We might also argue 
about whether private sector actors are likely to be more accountable to the pri-
vacy concerns of consumers than would be the government; or we may take the 
view that the fact that consumers often willingly share their information in 
private markets but may have less choice to opt out of government schemes is 
important, if not decisive, from a privacy perspective.  But to engage in this 
debate, we must take an externalist view and consider the costs that the price 
approach imposes on informational privacy, as well as the possible advantages 
of other institutional approaches in this same register. 
CONCLUSION 
The field of IP law today, as the name suggests, focuses predominantly 
on one modality of legal regulation of information: exclusive rights.  The central 
concern of the field is the optimal functioning of exclusive rights in informa-
tion—including, for example, their proper length and breadth, their proper admin-
istration, and their appropriate exceptions.  Arguments about the proper scope 
of IP law are generally arguments about the most efficient scope of IP law; 
efficiency is the dominant value to which the field responds. 
Yet efficiency analysis provides us with no general reason to favor IP over 
the many alternative means of sustaining the production of information goods.  
As shown in Part I, it is not possible to conclude a priori that IP is more effi-
cient than alternatives such as government procurement or commons-based 
production.  Economists have identified a range of influences that will affect 
the tradeoffs between IP and these other approaches.  At a minimum, these 
variables need to be assessed in context.  They may also be difficult to assess 
with certainty, leaving a substantial number of cases in which efficiency analysis 
cannot provide criteria for choosing between different innovation mechan-
isms.  Paradoxically, while efficiency is the touchstone of IP law, it provides 
no justification for making IP the centerpiece of conversations about infor-
mation policy. 
This is not visible under the internalist viewpoint that prevails in the field.  
But by telescoping out to bring institutional approaches other than IP into 
view, we give broader scope not only to conversations about efficiency, but also 
to conversations about fundamental values such as privacy and distributive justice.  
If economic arguments will often be indeterminate when comparing different 
institutional approaches to scientific and cultural production, then we would do 
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well to better develop our understanding of the implication of other values for 
such choices.   
Using exclusive rights to govern the production and distribution of infor-
mation is in tension with values of distributive justice and privacy because of the 
primary role that it accords to price.  When information is priced, it will be dispro-
portionately difficult for the poor to access.  Where information is involved, the 
central objection to this argument is not the usual one, which is that price may 
ultimately be beneficial because it is more efficient than are the alternatives (as 
we have seen, this is not clearly so).  Rather, it is the internalist argument that 
exemptions for the poor ultimately will not only promote but will also undermine 
access for the poor, because they will compromise the production of new infor-
mational goods.  As Part II shows, this argument is flawed, because it will 
sometimes be possible to give the poor access to information without substan-
tially disrupting the market for innovation.  But the flaw in this argument also 
shows its strength: Ultimately, to give real scope to distributive concerns, we 
must countenance not just exceptions internal to IP, but alternatives to IP that 
may be better situated to meet distributive aims. 
Government procurement and commons-based approaches do not depend 
on price to drive investment in information, so they can be more easily directed 
at the needs of the poor.  They can also be more progressively funded than IP in 
situations in which the rich and poor have the same needs.  There are some basic 
informational goods—goods like medicines or textbooks—that are so important 
that we may conclude that everyone should have them, whether or not they 
would choose to purchase them in a market setting.  The key virtue of price is 
said to be its ability to induce production of informational goods in accordance 
with what we value, because it links production to preferences in a decentralized 
fashion.  But when what we value is not the same as what people may prefer in 
markets, price can only misfire. 
An externalist view also allows us to see the tension between the IP 
approach and informational privacy that stems from the relationship between 
price, price discrimination, and privacy.  Choosing price as a means of produc-
ing and distributing information means that we want firms to price discri-
minate, because price discrimination will likely enhance efficiency.  Firms that 
price information will also find price discrimination very attractive as a strategy, 
and they may have the measure of market power needed to implement it.  But 
price discrimination requires copious personal information.  It also requires the 
ability to prevent arbitrage, and measures to prevent arbitrage may also undermine 
privacy.  Price and privacy are thus in structural tension in the context of 
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information.  The more we value privacy, the less attractive price is as a strategy 
for producing and distributing information. 
Other modes of information production plausibly generate less tension 
with privacy values.  While governments may wish to track demand when 
creating a contract or prize, they need not obtain the kind of information about 
individual willingness and ability to pay that is essential to price discrimination.  
Government data gathering may also be more transparent and accountable than is 
private data gathering.  Commons-based producers, in turn, may have no interest 
in external demand, much less individualized information about willingness and 
ability to pay.  When such producers do want information about how their 
works are being used, they may have limited resources to obtain it.  More 
sophisticated commons-based producers such as Wikipedia may protect user 
privacy to safeguard the norms or goodwill upon which their mode of produc-
tion relies. 
Once we recognize the problems that price poses for distributive justice and 
privacy, it also becomes clear that we cannot solve these problems from a perspec-
tive internal to IP law.  Compulsory licensing of patents, for example, may 
improve access to existing informational goods for the poor.  But it cannot make 
up for the demand failure that attends the mechanism of price, or for the fact 
that price tracks preferences while distributive justice requirements may not.  
Exceptions and limitations to IP also fail to redress the broader implications that 
price has for privacy.  While we can exempt certain personal uses from the reach 
of copyright law, for example, this will not address the broader implications 
that pricing information has for the widespread surveillance of consumer charac-
teristics and behaviors. 
The field of IP law should thus have a considerably broader frame of 
reference than it has today.  We should not treat IP as presumptively the right 
way to induce information production, and we should direct more effort toward 
understanding and developing approaches such as government procurement and 
commons-based production.  These approaches are already important to our sys-
tems of scientific and cultural production.  As importantly, we have some distance 
to go before attaining a comprehensive understanding of how law shapes and 
might reshape these different realms—much less of the normative and institu-
tional forces that help these approaches succeed or fail.  For example, as Part I 
discusses, one key to the effectiveness of the government contracting approach 
is the government’s ability to select sound research projects and to control the 
risks of capture.  A literature exists outside of law assessing, for example, the quality 
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of the peer review process at government agencies,192 as well as the influence of 
congressional committees and lobbying on the allocation of government grants.193  
Both peer review and congressional intervention in government funding decisions 
may be governed in part by legal frameworks,194 and, of course, also by norms.  
If we want to understand our system of scientific production and to improve 
its effectiveness, its fairness, and the like, then studying and critiquing these sys-
tems should be of importance to IP scholars, too.  The small legal literature 
addressing both government contracting and prizes as institutional approaches 
provides an important foundation for the development of this domain of work.195 
The new literature on the information or cultural commons has begun to 
explore the normative and institutional conditions that can help make such a 
commons function.  But more is needed to develop these early forays into a robust 
field of analysis.196  More, as well as more systematically structured, examples of 
functioning commons systems—and of failure in the commons—are needed.  
We also require more sophisticated accounts of how the IP system interacts with 
commons-based production, as well as systems based on government funding of 
science or culture.197  The question of where commons-based, government  
procurement, and IP approaches are complementary to one another, and where  
they may detract from or interfere with one another, is particularly important to 
  
192. See, e.g., Theodore A. Kotchen et al., NIH Peer Review of Grant Applications for Clinical Research, 
291 JAMA 836, 842–43 (2004) (offering evidence that the NIH peer review process favors grant 
applications for laboratory research over clinical research); Rustum Roy, Funding Science: The Real 
Defects of Peer Review and an Alternative to It, 10 SCI. TECH. & HUMAN VALUES 73 (1985) 
(summarizing criticisms of the peer review process at agencies such as NIH and NSF and offering 
alternatives).  For a description of the NIH peer review process, see Office of Extramural Research, 
Peer Review Process, NIH, http://grants.nih.gov/grants/peer_review_process.htm (last visited Feb. 
28, 2012).  
193. See, e.g., Deepak Hegde & David C. Mowery, Politics and Funding in the U.S. Biomedical R&D 
System, 322 SCIENCE 1797 (2008).  
194. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 289A (2006) (circumscribing the NIH peer review process); see also Deepak 
Hegde & David C. Mowery, Supporting Online Material for Politics and Funding in the U.S. 
Biomedical R&D System, SCIENCE (Dec. 19, 2008), http://www.sciencemag.org/content/suppl/ 
2008/12/18/322.5909.1797.DC1/Hegde.SOM.pdf (describing how congressional appropriations 
bills and committee reports affect NIH grantmaking, including by allocating funding among NIH 
institutes and by urging the NIH to direct resources toward particular diseases). 
195. Though it does not pretend to be comprehensive, a list of some important examples can be found 
in note 19, supra. 
196. Michael Madison, Brett Frischmann, and Katherine Strandburg offer one path forward here, in 
their important recent article urging more systematic investigation of the “constructed cultural 
commons.”  Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, supra note 20, at 657. 
197. See Eisenberg, supra note 18; Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open 
Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031 (2005); Rai, supra 
note 18. 
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our understanding of our fundamentally mixed ecology of scientific and cultural 
production.  The task is particularly pressing and complex given the recent ques-
tions raised about the potential of market-based norms to “crowd out” the more 
intrinsic norms that may motivate some commons-based creation.198 
Because efficiency analysis will often be indeterminate when asking exter-
nalist questions about the choice between innovation schemes, we should also 
develop our understanding of the implication of other values on the choice 
between approaches to innovation.  As I have argued, if we reason from values 
of distributive justice and privacy, we see that the commons and government 
procurement may have constitutive advantages over IP approaches, providing 
ample reason to consider the implication of such arguments in more detail in 
particular cases. 
A broader frame for the field would likely facilitate the kind of analysis 
called for in this Article.199  There is something incongruous about studying or 
teaching about the process of scientific peer review or innovation by online 
gamers under the rubric of intellectual property.  The question of the best frame 
for the field is an interesting and important one,200 but in calling for IP externalism, 
  
198. Yochai Benkler and Wendy Gordon have both recently brought attention to the rich economic 
and psychological literature on crowding out, and to its possible implications for IP law.  BENKLER, 
supra note 18, at 115; Wendy J. Gordon, Discipline and Nourish: On Constructing Commons, 95 
CORNELL L. REV. 733, 749 (2010); Wendy J. Gordon, Render Copyright Unto Caesar: On Taking 
Incentives Seriously, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 88 (2004).  For a discussion of intrinsic and extrinsic 
rewards and some of the potential pathways of crowding out, see, for example, Bruno S. Frey & 
Felix Oberholzer-Gee, The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-
Out, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 746, 746 (1997) (defining extrinsic motivation as “activated from the 
outside” and intrinsic motivation as relating to “activities one simply undertakes because one likes 
to do them or because the individual derives some satisfaction from doing his or her duty”); see also 
Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 J. ECON. SURVS. 589, 591 (2001).  
Also relevant here is recent empirical work, based on more conventional rational-actor models, 
that suggests that the introduction of IP into academic science may have led academics to shift 
their research toward questions of more commercial significance.  See Pierre Azoulay, Wavery 
Ding & Toby Stuart, The Impact of Academic Patenting on the Rate, Quality and Direction of (Public) 
Research Output, 57 J. INDUS. ECON. 637 (2009). 
199. A robust literature in sociology and psychology suggests that conceptual frameworks matter to 
how people understand issues.  For a brief review of the underlying literature, as well as an 
explanation of frame analysis, and an exploration of the role of framing related to the IP industries 
and the recent countermobilization, see Kapczynski, supra note 27.  The sense that the name of a 
field matters is reflected in recent arguments that the recasting of the distinct fields of “copyright,” 
“patent law,” and “trade secret law” under the more rarefied rubric of intellectual property has 
influenced the substantive contours of this area of law.  See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 27, at 1033.   
200. For example, we might consider frames such as “information law,” “innovation law,” or “the law of 
scientific and cultural production.”  The stakes of particular frames are worth investigating at 
greater length, but I note a few possible consequences of these three.  Using information as the 
central frame would likely reinforce the prominence of economic logic in the field, and focus our 
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I do not mean to suggest that we need to rename the field in order to give it a 
new geography.  We can adopt a broader frame of reference for our inquiries 
regardless of what we call the field.  Indeed, this move is already underway.   
The stakes of how we manage our information ecology today are broader 
than can be addressed inside the frame of IP law, or than can be encompassed 
under the rubric of efficiency alone.  If we are to have a field of legal inquiry that 
is adequate to the stakes of scientific and cultural production today, we should 
rethink the contours of the field of IP.  We should consider ourselves scholars 
of something more encompassing, whatever we call the field.  This will give 
more scope to our debates about how to efficiently produce immaterial resources, 
but as importantly, also give more scope to our discussions of how law in this area 
can promote values such as distributive justice and information privacy.  In the 
field of IP, then, we should pay less attention to IP and more to the alternatives. 
  
attention on the reified result of innovative or creative activity.  The latter two tend to call to the 
fore the human activities that produce scientific and cultural knowledge, rather than their result.  
In part for that reason, they might be more amenable to attempts to pluralize the values and 
institutions that we address in the field.  
 
Copyright of UCLA Law Review is the property of UCLA Law Review and its content may not be copied or
emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission.
However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
